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INTRODUCTION

Intellectual freedom is the opportunity to contemplate, consider,
challenge, reason, question and doubt; the opportunity to investigate, examine
and dispute. It is the freedom to think and the freedom of expression.
Professor Mari Matsuda advocates a sliding scale of free speech with the
rights belonging mainly to the powerless, the outsiders.' Nat Hentoff, on the
other hand, contends that we all believe in free speech for us, but not for
anyone else. 2 Holocaust survivors think anti-semitic speech should be
prohibited.' Women's rights advocates think any speech that degrades
women should be outlawed.'
The free speech movement is out; the
politically-correct movement is in.
Freedom can and does breed a variety of intolerance, an intolerance that
is a potential threat to any democratic society. "The energetic presentation
of ideas is the most positive way to advance democratic institutions."5 And
yet, "[i]ntolerance attacks at every point of disagreement, insisting on
conformity of every outward action, including speech, and frequently
attempts to control the inner world of the mind as well."6 The logical
starting point in the search for the outer limits of tolerance is when and

1. Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consider the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2300, 2380-81 (1989).
BUT NOT FOR THEE: HOW THE
2. See NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME AMERICAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER (1992).
3. Berkeley: ProtestersShut Down Allegedly "Anti-Semitic" Historianfor Second Time,
DECLARATION, FLORIDA'S CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Apr.-May 1995, at 23. British
Holocaust historian, David Irving, canceled his March 1995 speaking engagement, which was
sponsored by a Muslim group, at the University of California at Berkeley when over 200
protesters pushed and shoved those who came to hear him. Id.
4. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993). Catharine MacKinnon argues
that censorship is a necessary means for women to achieve equality. Id. at 71-110. See also
AVEDON CAROL, NUDES, PRUDES, AND ATTITUDES: PORNOGRAPHY AND CENSORSHIP (1994).
5. Molefi K. Asante, Unraveling the Edges of Free Speech, 75 NAT'L F. 12, 14 (1995);
see also Mary Lefkowitz, Exploring the Boundaries of Academic Freedom, 75 NAT'L F. 16,
18-19 (1995); Max Beloff, Why We Need A University Elite, THE TIMES (London), August
19, 1995, at 14.
6. Lee C. Bollinger, The Open Minded Soldier, 37 LAW QUAD. 54, 56 (Summer 1994)
[hereinafter Bollinger, The Open Minded Soldier]. See also LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986) [hereinafter BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY]; Thomas
Numally, Word Up Word Down, 75 NAT'L F. 36 (1995).
Evidentially a society will not dispense with the category of taboo language ....
One may argue that the basis of taboo has shifted from the physical body and the
sacred to the body political and conception of social justice. The same sense of outrage and defilement associated in the past with subjection to "filthy language" now
appears to be associated with political incorrect speech, that is, language lacking
sensitivity toward different ethnic cities, enactments, and orientations.
Id. at 37.
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where values collide, that is, when one group attempts to suffocate the
"truths" of the colliders. At this collision point the university is most
vulnerable.
The history of censorship of speech and of persecution and punishment
for ideas held, expressed or challenged has produced insightful observations
about the human desire to have one's own way, to demand that others conform to it and to rid the world of those who will not or cannot conform.
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.
If you.., want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition."7
Those who believe that the definition of tolerance has been pushed to the
outer edge by the United States Supreme Court have chosen to draw the line
in the university setting. In drawing the line, there is a final resolution of the
so-called "exquisite dilemma," that is, the free trade or marketplace of ideas
versus the potentially powerful impact some of those expressions have upon
certain groups. The rhyming advice to children that "sticks and stones may
break my bones but words will never hurt me" can be disputed since the free
trade of ideas can and has produced hurtful results. During the waning years
of this century, many observers would concede that there has been a profound and disturbing rise in bigotry and of expressions intended to diminish
and demean on our college and university campuses.8
Incidents of virulent prejudice are not restricted to the more traditional
race and religious groups. In addition to acts of hate and hostility against
Blacks and Jews, students at many institutions of higher learning have
directed their aggression toward women, homosexuals, Asians and the
elderly.9 A growing number of high school and college students, fueled
perhaps by cultural ignorance and fired by media reports of affirmative action
and advancements in diversity, appear to fear and hate anyone who belongs
to a group different from themselves, particularly from groups seeking
traditional notions of equality. This is not the product of academic
ignorance. Some of this country's finest academies appear to nurture the
worst manifestations of this hatred. The examples are legion and well7. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8. Lessons From Bigotry 101, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 1989, at 48. According to the
Baltimore-based National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence, since 1986, more than 250
colleges and universities have reported racist incidents, ranging from swastikas painted on
walls to violent attacks and death threats. Nancy Gibbs, Bigots in the Ivory Tower, TIME,
May 7, 1990, at 104. Similarly, Reginald Wilson of the American Council on Education
recently said, "These incidents are now happening with such alarming frequency that they
have become an embarrassment for our institutions of higher learning." Lessons From Bigotry
101, supra, at 48.
9. Richard Vacca & H.C. Huggins, Student Speech and the First Amendment: The
Court's Operationalizethe Notion of Assaultive-Speech, 89 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1994). See also
Steven Lewis, Looking Down the Empty Barrel, 75 NAT'L F. 40 (1995).
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recorded elsewhere; l° nevertheless, consider: (1) A first-year Hispanic
student at Bryn Mawr College found an anonymous note calling her an ethnic
slur and stating: "[I]f you and your kind can't hack the work here ... just
get out";" (2) The fear of AIDS led to a rampage of gay-bashing episodes
at Pennsylvania State University; 12 and (3) After seventeen years of
teaching, a tenured professor at Florida A & M University was dismissed by
administrators after seven students accused him of remarking that "sitting
around and waiting for opportunities or not taking advantage of the
opportunities that are there is kind of a what some would call a n---mentality."1 3 These are examples of the types of occurrences that have
become almost routine on college campuses. 4
Such displays of racism, sexism, homophobia and anti-Semitism foreshadow the disintegration of the community of scholars and the idyllic vision
many have held of college life. A survey conducted by The Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching concluded that romantic
notions of campus life serve to mask what appears to be a disturbing reality
of the hate that has infiltrated university life in the United States. 15
However, Vince Herron contends that the abundant reports of animosity in
universities do not, in themselves, suggest that there is more malice in the
university setting than in the outside world; in fact,
it is possible that univer16
sities actually have fewer occurrences of bigotry.
Observers of the use of words to hurt and exclude have offered different
explanations for this "hate" trend on campuses. Regardless of the explanation, one element is apparent: "self."' 7 It would appear that this
country is now paying an enormous price for national and state leadership
that has and does glorify selfishness," ignorance and insensitivity. In

10. See generally Vince Herron, Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech Codes,
and the Pursuit of Truth, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 407 (1994).
11. Gibbs, supra note 8, at 104.
12. Id. at 105.
13. Bill Bergstrom, Racial Remark Leads to Firing, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 12,
1993, at BI.
14. Another incident took place at San Francisco State University when a mural of
Malcolm X was splattered with red paint. "The mural was criticized as anti-semitic by some
Jewish students." Amid Protests, Mural Honoring Malcolm X Is Defaced, CH1. TRIB., May
21, 1994, at 2.
15. Gibbs, supra note 8, at 104.
16. Herron, supra note 10, at 534.
17. Gibbs, supra note 8, at 105. Jon Wiener, Racial Hatred on Campus, THE NATION,
Feb. 27, 1989, at 260. Daniel Levitas, Executive Director of the Center for Democratic
Renewal, stated, "We have today a whole young society that has not been called to conscience."
18. Peter Edelman, PunishingPerpetratorsof Race and Speech, LEGAL TIMES, May 15,
1989, at 20. Consider the primary function of most elected officials (Florida, in particular)
which is to cut taxes, avoid helping the less fortunate and put more persons behind bars for
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addition to being influenced by cultural materialism, the current phenomenon
also appears to be a byproduct of the cultural and ethnic polarization that
developed in earnest during the Reagan Administration.' 9 Illustrative of this
polarization of perspective is one Amherst student's innocent (or, I would
hope, tongue-in-cheek) question: "Who was Malcolm The Tenth?"2 This
dearth of cultural knowledge, appreciation and/or sensitivity seems to emerge
on a student's first experience with diversity (i.e., people of different cultures,
races and values). Ill-equipped to confront the diversity of college life and
questioning the free trade of ideas, a student's psychological chemistry
becomes volatile.2'
In response to the rise of hatred and harassment on campuses, many
colleges and universities, once the advertised bastions of the free marketplace
of ideas and intellectual academic freedom, have attempted to limit hateful
speech through campus conduct codes. 22 The codes, combined with
political correctness, suffocate free speech. Donald Kagan, a dean at Yale
University, has said that at many colleges "there is an imposed conformity
of opinions with less freedom now that there was [during the days of Joseph
McCarthy]. Utilizing a technique learned from Senator Joseph McCarthy in
an earlier attack on free speech, those not utilizing correct thinking are
labeled bigots or racists or sexists., 23 Among the more than 200 institutions
with politically-correct speech codes of conduct are: the University of Wisconsin, the University of Michigan, Stanford University and the Universities
of California.24 Yale University administrators have refused to compromise
the issue of free speech and have condemned the codes. 25 The attitude of
Yale is an aberration as an increasing number of schools enact their own
definitions or versions of where to draw the line on free speech and when to

longer periods of time.
19. Alexander Reid, Colleges Gropefor Solutions to Racism, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 18,
1988, at 106.
20. Gibbs, supra note 8, at 105.
21. Id. See also Bollinger, The Open Minded Soldier, supra note 6, at 57.
22. Patrick M. Garry, Censorshipby the Free Speech Generation, 75 NAT'L F. 29 (1995).
A majority of colleges and universities now have some form of written policy on bigotry,
including racial and gender intimidation. See PATRICK M. GARRY, AN AMERICAN PARADOX:
CENSORSHIP IN A NATION OF SPEECH (1993); Barry Seigel, FightingWords, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
28, 1993, § 14 (Magazine), at 14, 46.
23. See RICHARD BUNSTER, DICTATORSHIP OF VIRTUE (1994); Bollinger, The Open
Minded Soldier, supra note 6, at 55.
24. Steve France, Hate Goes to College, 76 A.B.A. J. 44 (1990). Stanford dismantled its
core curriculum of 15 required classic readings and allowed students to create their own
curriculum. Bill Marvel & Barbara Kessler, University at Center of Debate, GAINESVILLE
(FLA.) SUN, Jun. 5, 1994, at GI.
WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1989, at
25. Nat Hentoff, Campus Follies: From FreeSpeech .
A23.
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suffocate perceived intolerant thought.26
These codes of conduct prohibit speech that creates a demeaning atmosphere and other undesirable effects.27 The codes attempt to predefine the
scope of permissible speech; often, they are accompanied by interpretive
guides. The University of Connecticut's proclamation banned inappropriately
directed laughter and conspicuous exclusion of students from conversations;
the code prohibited "derogatory references" or "fighting words" that harass
anyone face-to-face.2" What is inappropriately directed laughter? What is
derogatory? What are fighting words? It is good to be made aware of the
power of words to hurt and exclude, but who is appointed or selected to
judge? How does one define hate? There are many definitions in university
conduct codes but most include: face-to-face confrontation, exclusion of
certain groups and certain types of prohibited speech. Eric Neisser defined
hate speech as referring to all types of communication, whether verbal,
written or symbolic, that insult a racial or ethnic group, whether by
suggesting that they are inferior in some respect or by indicating that they are
despised or not welcome.29 One does not have to define hate; the codes are
not dealing with hate speech, per se, but with certain defined, intolerant
speech. The University of California's code does not define hate but punishes speech that attacks "race, sex, sexual orientation or disability,"30 political content notwithstanding.
Proponents of these codes claim that speech that harms is not speech at
all. Hate speech, as defined by the drafters of the codes, includes speech
uttered for no other reason than its harmful effects, and therefore, it deserves
no constitutional protection. 3 Many commentators invalidate hate speech
as speech by rationalizing that it is not a crime to hate; it is, however, illegal
to hurt.32 They ignore the lessons of history, "the suffocating and cruel
tendencies of true belief . . . ."" Similarly, while "there is no such thing
as a false idea,"34 the codes imply that there is no idea to protect present in

26. See Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J.
399, 400 (1991).
27. France, supra note 24, at 44. See also Garry, supra note 22, at 30.
28. Gibbs, supra note 8, at 106.
29. Eric Neisser, Hate Speech in the New South Africa: ConstitutionalConsiderationsfor
a Land Recoveringfrom Decades of Racial Repression and Violence, 5 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 103 (1994).
30. Hentoff, supra note 25, at A23. Universities such as North Carolina, Duke and
Stanford have implemented plans specifically restricting racist speech. Lessons from Bigotry
101, supra note 8, at 48.
31. Take Care, ECoNoMIST, Feb. 10, 1990, at 20, 23. But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
32. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2320, 2380-81.
33. See Bollinger, The Open Minded Soldier, supra note 6, at 57.
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
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hate speech. Consequently, such codes are not an impermissible regulation
of content because there is no content to regulate in hate speech."
Opponents of conduct codes argue that codes violate the First
Amendment3 6 right of free speech, as well as, the duty to be true to the
university's purpose to be a free-fire zone where the combatants can
honorably trade in ideas.3 7 When faced with the issue of speech control,
some faculty members at the University of Connecticut denounced their
campus code as an act of the "Thought Police" that attempted to muzzle the
free exchange of ideas. 38 The code, they warned, invites misinterpretation
and self-censorship.3 9 Many others have spoken out against speech
codes.40 A college administrator in Colorado argued that if colleges start
restricting the speech of some students in the name of social civility, the very
groups that the codes are aimed at protecting easily could be the next victims
of censorship.41 Indeed, that is precisely what seems to be happening. At
most universities, Louis Farrakhan would fall victim to campus codes
outlawing hate speech,4 2 assuming that the given hate-speech code was
uniformly enforced. Moreover, those against the codes do not focus solely
on the potential misapplication of the restrictions. For example, a Jewish law
student at Stanford found the special protection that such codes afforded to
be "demeaning. 4 3
The philosophies of both the opponents and proponents of conduct codes
comprise what has been called the exquisite dilemma. 44 Each side believes
that it represents an unequivocal commitment to the twin goals of equality
and free speech. 45 The exquisite dilemma has become the dichotomy
between free speech and equal rights. Campus codes have, in reality, become
attempts at political enfranchisement.
There are other methods than hate-speech codes by which this exquisite

35. See VWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wisc. 1991); Doe
v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); David Rosenberg, Racist Speech,
the FirstAmendment and Public Universities: Taking a Stand on Neutrality, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 549, 551 (1991). See also Thomas McAllister, Rules and Rights Colliding: Speech
Codes and the FirstAmendment on College Campuses, 59 TENN. L. REv. 409, 410 (1992).
36. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1963).
38. Gibbs, supra note 8, at 106.
39. Id.
40. See Herron, supra note 10, at 407.
41. Nat Hentoff, Battling the Speech Police, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1990, at A25 (quoting
Gwen Thomas, candidate for president of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)).
42. Wiener, supra note 17, at 274.
43. France, supra note 24, at 46 (quoting comments of Wendy Leibowitz).
44. Id. at 44.
45. Id. See also Thomas Cinti, Freedom Is Slavery: The Thought Police Have Come to
America's Campuses, I CONST. L.J. 383 (1991).
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dilemma can be addressed. Frequently, education - both affective and
cognitive - is designated as the natural route by which to deal with hate
speech.16 One proposal is to realign curriculum to include non-Western
courses, courses which offer a different perspective from the Eurocentric
character of most present programs.47 This antidote is aimed at combating
lack of awareness, the cultural insularity that engenders bigotry. 8 Other alternatives include weekend retreats and curricular sensitivity training, as well
as, commitments to minority hiring49 and inculcating respect for national
origin."
At one point, the University of Wisconsin committed itself to
hiring seventy new minority faculty members in three years.5
Smith
College and Columbia University, both sites of extreme exercises of hate
speech, have begun mandatory programs in ethnic and cultural sensitivity.52
Finally, in many cases, colleges are encouraged to insure that local hatecrime laws, quite distinct from hate-speech codes, are enforced on campus. 3
The sad fact is that universities have begun to forfeit their claim as a free
trade in ideas zone. There is little to distinguish the secondary academy,
where endorsed indoctrination occurs in earnest, from the university with its
hate-speech code, despite the fact that, as one Amherst professor noted, "You
can't legislate tolerance from above. 5 4 Nonetheless, many universities have
taken prescriptive measures. Some are encouraging diversity, yet, at the
same time they are intimidating students and faculty, and insuring "right
thoughts" by threats, harassment and required sensitivity seminars. What is
happening at the nation's academies is antithetical to the values that
educational institutions claim to promote and instill; these last vestiges of a
free trade in ideas zone are the worst for it. Furthermore, the inculcation of
the free trade of ideas must begin elsewhere. Yet, the "elsewhere,"
elementary and secondary schools, is for the most part ignored as a value
carrier in the hate speech controversy.
The purpose of this paper is first to explore the nature and level of the
academy in question and its general relationship to the First Amendment.
Second, the paper reviews free speech and its relationship to the concept of
intellectual academic freedom. The constitutionalization of the concept of

46. Gibbs, supra note 8, at 104.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Reid, supra note 19, at 106.
50. Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin"
DiscriminationUnder Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994).
51. Reid, supra note 19, at 106.
52. Id.
53. Editorial, A Dip in Hate, But Not on Campus?, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1990, at 12. See
also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
54. France, supra note 24, at 44.
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intellectual academic freedom is a step the Supreme Court never has been
prepared to take, despite its grandiose dicta to the contrary. 55 Nevertheless,
when free speech is in peril in the very academy where it is thought to have
a safe haven, the Court can, as it has in the past, choose to intercede.
Finally, this paper concludes by illustrating the current hostility toward and
the trivialization of the worth of free speech in academic settings. This is
more damaging to a free society than the hate speech itself. Judging from
university responses to student activism in the 1960s, production of hatespeech codes on a large scale is probably inevitable. The production appears
to result, in part, as a consequence of the Supreme Court's view of its role
as Republican Schoolmaster, 6 and thus, its ambivalence toward intervening
in an academic setting in order to conduct a seminar on First Amendment
jurisprudence. Unfortunately, if academics cannot respect the value of a free
trade in ideas zone in a democratic society, then it might be necessary once
again for the Court to protect academics from themselves.
II.

SPEECH IN THE ACADEMY: ITS RECENT ROOTS

First and foremost, free speech is not, nor has it ever been, a personal
privilege. It is, however, essential for scholars, students and faculty, if they
are to function effectively in the educational community and are to be more
than just professional orators. Academicians gathering in various institutions
have a responsibility to facilitate the flow of idea-oriented dialogue. The
beneficiary is society. At times it would appear that society resents academic
and intellectual freedom (although when the Court speaks, it speaks of
academic freedom, I, nevertheless, consider intellectual freedom to be more
descriptive of the task at hand). One reason might be because the academic
in this country functions not only as a scholar, but also as an active and
passive political critic. Our fast-moving, complex society needs and demands
examination of old and new ideas, information and values.
What then does this all mean? What are proper subjects for scholarly
inquiry? How can university administrations representing society protect
themselves against unpleasant condemnation? To study and evaluate only the
known can be an exercise in inertia; to venture beyond the known is the
worth of the scholar. Such worth cannot be generated in a vacuum. It needs
to be nurtured; the scholar by nature must be involved in the risks of
questioning, challenging, doubting and disputing that bring about social
and/or scientific change. This involves disrupting the establishment, the
status quo, and for that matter, the disenfranchised. This often results in the

55. Papish v. University of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1973).
56. See Fletcher Baldwin, The United States Supreme Court: A Creative Check of
Institution Misdirection?, 45 IND. L.J. 550 (1970).
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victim of the disruption exercising every means at his or her disposal to
prevent further action. These tactics include jailing the speaker, removing the
speaker from a position of influence, controlling the speaker's words,
reeducating the speaker to speak without harmful impact or simply permitting
students to disrupt the speaker's presentation, class or setting. Should the
university administration allow speakers to be silenced because what they say
inflames the audience? The heckler's veto strangles free speech. This veto
is legitimized by the extremes of left and right.
Today, concern focuses on a scholar's speech and the resulting harm to
an outsider and his/her outgroup, who are now able to muster influential
power. Certainly any action taken by an academic power-holder that would
substantially impair intellectual freedom should be condemned. Yet, it would
seem that where scholars aggressively inquire into social ills or societal
direction, their activism, by its very definition, is a threat.
Too often the colleagues of activists do not support, and in many cases
even attack, quarrelsome, disruptive brethren. Why? Professor William Van
Alstyne recounts the Supreme Court of Tennessee's response in 1927 to John
Thomas Scopes' appeal from a conviction resulting from teaching evolution
to public school students. 57 The Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Green, stated categorically that "[Scopes] had no right or privilege to serve
the state except upon such terms the state prescribed .... In dealing with its
own employees engaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by the
limitations of ...the Fourteenth Amendment .... 58 According to Chief
Justice Green, the United States Constitution would be trivialized if the Court
permitted Scopes to set his own agenda.5 9
Although at the time Chief Justice Green's premise appeared to be
correct, constitutional lawyers now would disagree with the conclusion.
However, in light of recent case law,6 ° perhaps the Tennessee Supreme
Court's 1927 theory is not far from the 1990s' mark. To be sure, the United
States Supreme Court speaks in elegant terms when addressing the
constitutional concept of incorporation and its relationship to speech. 6 1 But
a review of the modem case law, beginning with Sweezy v. New

57. William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General
Issue of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed.,
1975).

58. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (1927).
59. See id.
60. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
61. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,
74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964). See also Fletcher Baldwin, Methods of Social Control of Academic
Activists Within the University Setting, 14 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429 (1970); Note, Development
in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
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Hampshire,62 demonstrates the Court's belief that there is no separate
constitutional theory, aside from general First Amendment guarantees, that
federal courts ordinarily look to in reviewing intellectual academic freedom
challenges. Further, the judicial line of demarcation separating the secondary
academy, where values are inculcated, from the university academy, 63 where
values are challenged, has, for constitutional purposes, become blurred, if not
erased.
The Court speaks of a separate constitutional theory, but acts otherwise
because the concept of academic freedom as a subset of the First Amendment
presents the Court and constituency with difficult and complex problems.
These problems contribute to the Court's reluctance to allocate to the
offended professor, teacher or student a perceived "extra right" to be
constitutionally protected. 64 Thus, the Supreme Court recognizes and
protects the general civil liberties of those who study and labor in the
academy but make their political statements elsewhere, although not officially
as a member of the academy.
The Court seems to have difficulty in understanding the boundaries of the
core rationale of academic freedom. To date, the Court has failed or refused
to delineate those boundaries. As Professor Van Alstyne points out, the
Court has only been willing to state in dicta what the boundaries of academic
freedom should be.65 Justification for the concept of academic freedom is
found in the unique historic nature and function of the academy and the
scholars housed therein. The professional affiliations are of no concern here.
Rather, the focus is upon the narrower professional pursuit that separates the
academy from standard First Amendment review.66 It is this opening that
has resulted in the flood of scholarship condemning what the given author
deems to be non-speech, hence subject to control and restraint.67

62. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
63. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
64. Id. See also Papish v. University of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973). "'State colleges and
universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.'. . . [T]he First
Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community
with respect to the content of speech." Id. at 670-71 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
180 (1972).
65. Van Alstyne, supra note 57, at 64-67. See also Richard Hiers, Academic Freedom
in Public Colleges and Universities, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 3 (1993) (reviewing the history of
the Supreme Court and academic freedom).
66. Van Alstyne, supra note 57, at 80.
67. See, e.g., Ronald J. Rychlak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags and Political
Correctness: Free Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1411 (1992).
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THE ACADEMY

A.

Preface

Many anti-speech elements seem to lose sight of the broad purpose of the
academic institution. If the university is to remain vital, it must explore ideas
and question concepts that may not be in accord with society at large.6 8
Antagonism is inevitable. If the antagonism does not hinder academic
pursuits, it can be healthy.
B. Academic or Intellectual Freedom
"Intellectual freedom is the 'inherent human right [n]ot to be bound in
one's reason and conscience,' but rather 'to search unceasingly for what one
believes to be truth." ' '69 This right does not proscribe any viewpoint or
cause.7" Indeed, intellectualism is "a style of living in which the world of
thought... is given priority over any practical consideration"7 even though
the thought may be considered detestable. If there is a right of access to
ideas, it must be shared by all. But just as the press plays a major role in the
First Amendment right to receive ideas, so also, the academy is designed to
serve as a fiduciary to the people's right of access and exploration.
1. Lehrfreiheit -

Freedom to Teach

An analysis of the doctrine of academic freedom usually begins with the
evolution of the concept. It seems the concept of academic freedom had its
rebirth in nineteenth-century Germany. The German language embodies the
idea of unrestrained academic pursuit in two expressions: Lehrfreiheitfreedom to teach, and Lernfreiheit - freedom to learn.72 Under the aegis
of the law and the concept of Lehrfreiheit, professors in German universities
were free to discuss whatever they wanted in their classes, and also, were
73
free to pursue scholarly research on whatever topic they pleased.

68. See General Robert M. O'Neii, Academic Freedom and the Constitution, 1 J.C. &
U.L. 275 (1984).
69. Comment, School Boards, Schoolbooks and the Freedom to Learn, 59 YALE L.J. 928,
942 n.58 (1950) (quoting Johnsen, Academic Freedom, 3 REFERENCE SHELF 6, 7-8 (1925)).
70. See id. at 942-44.
71. Walter 0. Weyrauch, Medieval Universities,Germany and the United States: On Comparative Legal Education, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 613, 615.
72. Howard Jones, The American Concept ofAcademic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND TENURE 225 (Louis Joughin ed., 1967). See generally Note, supra note 61.
73. Jones, supra note 72, at 225. See also Walter Metzger, The Age of the University, in
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 275, 367-412 (Richard
Hofstadter & Walter Metzger eds., 1955).
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However, a professor's political speech and thought were not protected outside the university setting.74 In universities in the United States, professors
perceive that they have the same freedom to teach as nineteenth-century
German professors. However, in the United States, the university and/or the
courts extend this freedom one step further, allowing a professor First
Amendment protection with respect to political belief and thought outside of
the university."
2.

Substantive Right or Duty -

The University

The United States Supreme Court has considered the question of freedom
of speech within a narrow professional pursuit and its relationship to a more
global civil liberty 76 without respect to profession. Even though the Court's
consideration has resulted in generalities, it is worth examining. As the
Court noted in Barenblatt v. United States, 77 academic freedom is an essential ingredient for scholars if they are to function effectively within the
academy, and if they are to be more than Paul Goodman's professional
orator. Academicians who gather on university campuses have a professional
responsibility to society to maintain the flow of dialogue.
The United States Supreme Court has for some thirty-plus years been
committed to safeguarding academic freedom. This freedom is of transcendent value to all citizens and not merely to teachers and students concerned
with the First Amendment; a concern which does not tolerate laws that cast
a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.7" Through case language, it appears
the Court is arguing for a societal right to receive the labors of the
academician without governmental restraints.
3. Spirit of the First
Although academic freedom is not an express right enumerated in the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court repeatedly has relied on the broad
protection of constitutional guarantees to justify such expressions. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,79 a non-academic freedom case, the Court
74. Jones, supra note 72, at 225-26.
75. Id. at 229. See generally Ralph Fuchs, Academic Freedom - Its Basic Philosophy,
Function, and History, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 431 (1963).
76. See Van Alstyne, supra note 57.
77. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
78. Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right of privacy, a right not specifically within the scope
of the First Amendment but rather a right that hovers over all the First Amendment rights,
furthers the concepts of academic and intellectual freedom. The right of privacy concerns
itself with fundamental rights; those rights personal to individuals and their way of life. The
Supreme Court appeared to create the right in Griswold. Id. at 485. According to the Court,
a Connecticut statute that prohibited and restricted the right of married couples to use
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contraceptives was unconstitutional. Id. at 486. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
noted that these statutes limited the married persons' right of privacy to have the freedom to
choose whether they want to have children. Id. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
However, the Court has extended this concept to include other matters relating to one's
personal life. See generally Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (right to legal materials
and access to courts); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (right to transcript in misdemeanor appeals); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (fundamental right to privacy
regarding marital decisions); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate
travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right of privacy regarding marital decisions);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to counsel in first appeal on
a criminal case); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association).
The reasoning of these cases logically includes the right to teach and the right to learn.
Individuals possess an expectation of privacy to be free to discuss, to inquire and to explore
various topics that are beneficial and personal to the individual. Teachers must have this right
to determine, within reasonable bounds, subjects of interest to teach their students. As
previously mentioned, a biased view of a topic is not sufficient, but rather there should be
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open" discussion of the issues. New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The right of privacy is the nucleus of the student's right to learn.
Students should be provided with a breadth of information so that eventually they will be able
to decide for themselves what views and what opinions they want to hold. Only with the
evolvement of their ability to think can students begin to understand various ideologies. To
formulate their own thoughts, students need to choose for themselves what areas they need
to explore.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure,
and satisfactions of life are found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone, - the comprehension of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1929) (emphasis added) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "[W]e should not overlook the fact that the spirit of America is liberty and toleration
- the disposition to allow each person to live his own life in his own way, unhampered by
unreasonable and arbitrary restrictions." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 392 (1922).
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley: "The right to one's person may be said
to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone."
Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (quoting Cooley on Torts, 29).
[T]here is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual,
has, if any, only an indirect interest: comprehending all that portion of a person's
life and conduct which affects only himself or, if it also affects others, only with
their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only
himself, I mean directly and in the first instance; for whatever affects himself may
affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this
contingency will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate
region of human liberty ....
[T]he principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits,
of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject
to such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow creatures,
so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our
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strengthened the conclusion that there may exist a societal right to receive
information by noting that "the State may not, consistently with the spirit of
the First Amendment, contract a spectrum of available knowledge. 80 More
specifically, the Court in Sweezy v. New Hampshire8' argued for
constitutional protection and cursorily noted that academic freedom is not a
personal privilege but a necessity. Therefore, academic freedom demands
that scholars effectively perform their functions of teaching, learning, practice
and research. Without these freedoms, democracy is imperiled.
The Court has been concerned in the abstract with the subset of academic
freedom. 2 If there were a constitutional rule regarding academic freedom,
it would be as follows: There can be no governmental hinderance upon
academic investigation, research, teaching and publication, except upon evidence of an inexcusable breach of professional ethics in the exercise of that
freedom.83 Thus, the concept of academic freedom, as it has emerged
primarily in dicta, is at best a general constitutional principle rooted in the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and tied to societal well-being. Certainly,
in theory, that right was not intended to duplicate freedom of speech or press.
Rather, the Supreme Court cases suggest that the Court has been crafting a
separate substantive right.
4.

The Academic Setting -

Procedural

The difficulty is that this concept of academic freedom requires substantive judicial modification of the Court's free speech standard of review when
the Court is confronted with applying the concept to specific facts. If the
right and its accompanying theory could transcend the protection of free
speech, the academic setting would force the Court to focus upon First
Amendment claims deemed acceptable within the academy, but perhaps,

conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong....
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free,
whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they
do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name
is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to
deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper
guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind are
greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by
compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.
State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 24 (Alaska 1978) (Mathews, J., concurring) (quoting JOHN
STUART MILLS, ON LIBERTY

(1848)).

80. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
81. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
82. See J.Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concernof the FirstAmendment,"
99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989).
83. See Jones, supra note 72.
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unacceptable in the larger community.84 This, the Court has been reluctant
to do. Yet, by the Court's own earlier admission, the unique nature and
purpose of the academy may well be determinative of a claim where ordinarily a free speech or press claim would fail. 85 Even in Miller v. California,86 the Court recognized a scientific and educational exception to the
pornography prohibition. This is not to suggest that the right of academic
freedom is absolute even in the name of enlightenment; it is not. The Court
(not to mention politicians) has been very sensitive to charges of elitism.
These charges have been brought about by misuse and misunderstanding of
the concept academic freedom.
Like all constitutional freedoms, the diligent protection of academic
freedom is nowhere more vital than in institutions of learning. Simply put,
the context of the academic setting should provide the Court with an additional constitutional consideration. The claim of academic freedom is neither
merely a free-speech claim by any one person in the academy, as in
Pickering v. Board of Education," nor a claim to free speech in an
academic environment. If one has a technical right to be in an academic
environment, then one has a duty to work with the mind which, in part, implies the right to speak! This right is based upon a more limited, independent right, that is, freedom from government (any governing body) restraint
and punishment where the intellectual pursuit is deemed a necessary corollary
to teaching and research. Practically speaking, this independent right is easy
to state, but impossible to apply. More importantly, within the context of the
so-called hate-speech regulations, the limitations have come from within the
academy itself, where respect for the concept has, in fact, given way to
expediency. This results in divorcing universities from their traditional role,
leaving others (e.g., think tanks) to fill the void. Furthermore, there are few
outside procedural protections from the need to regulate and conform,
generated from within. 8
IV. THE LOWER EDUCATIONAL STRATUM
A.

Substantive Rights or Recognized Responsibilities?

Another problem when attempting to define an academic freedom right
is the Court's definition of "the academy." What is supposed to separate the
university from the secondary academy? Is it merely a question of the age

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

But see Van Alstyne, supra note 57.
See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968).
See Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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of some of the constituents? The Court seems to answer by focusing upon
the concept of prescribed orthodoxy. Prescribed orthodoxy is constitutionally
acceptable on the campus of the lower academy. The university is viewed
as having a different role. Many universities in their rush to dam up
intolerance and lingering wounds have reverted to orthodoxy. Under the
guise of protecting the human rights of underrepresented classes, universities
simply translate the expression of ideas into acts. Sound familiar? Recall
Senator Joseph McCarthy. He, of course, was protecting us from the evils
of Communism. Those who disagreed were labeled and brought into public
disrepute. "In the McCarthy era, an individual was labeled a 'sympathizer'
' 89
or a 'fellow traveler'; the person now is said to be 'racist' or 'sexist.'
The courts have traditionally considered secondary level education as an
indoctrination period where students are "inculcated with community values." 90 The role of the lower institution is different from that of the university, which transmits knowledge as well as develops critical faculties for
learning extremely creative tasks. 9' "[T]he quality of instruction at the lower levels, especially at the high school, depends to an important degree on the
extent of freedom in the classroom and the intellectual integrity of the teaching force."92 However, that integrity has been greatly compromised at the
lower level academies; only the college or university nurtures a freedom-tolearn environment. Many, however, may prefer a politically-correct milieu
at the higher-level academy.
B. Lernfreiheit - Freedom to Learn
In education there must be both the freedom to teach and the freedom to
learn.93 German students in the nineteenth century had freedom in the
choice of studies. They were free "to roam from place to place, sampling
academic wares."'94 Generally, the students, were responsible for their own
studies. The only examination the German student took was the final one. 95
They were allowed to skip intermediate tests. Perhaps, this had as much to
do with the class of the student as with the concept of intellectual freedom. However, the German gymnasium or high school appears to have
been as, or more, structured in its learning methodology 97 than high schools
89. See Bollinger, The Open Minded Soldier, supra note 6, at 55.
90. See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853

(1982).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Note, supra note 61, at 1050.
Id.
Id. at 1049.
Id.
Id. at 1048-49.
Weyrauch, supra note 71, at 619.
See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 37.
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in the United States. Both restricted and compromised the freedom to
think. 98
The public school system in the United States may never have fully
accepted the concept of a student's freedom to think. It has never approved
of Lernfreiheit, at least at the secondary level. 99 Academic freedom pre-

98. Jones, supra note 72, at 225-28. There are four main reasons why the educational
system in the United States has failed to adopt the concept of Lernfreiheit. Id. at 225.

The first is that in the eyes of the law the school, college, or university stands
in loco parentis with reference to its students, especially if the students are in point
of law minors. This means that the college is compelled to accept a parietal responsibility for student welfare unknown to the German system ....

The second reason arises out of the deliberate cultivation by American institutions of learning of active parental interest in the life of the college or university.
[Parents] are encouraged to visit the campus and attend classes, . . . appeals are
made to the domestic pocketbook for money that will make the college a home
away from home. . . . [T]he interest of the institution in initiating, guiding and

controlling extracurricular activities - all these move in exactly the opposite
direction from institutional indifference to student welfare; and, admirable in themselves, they create innumerable regulations by the college that actually restrict
student freedom . ...

[Y]ou cannot remain enrolled unless you maintain a

minimum competence in a minimum number of courses; you cannot leave the
institution at will; and you cannot wander from university to university, since
transfer of credits from one institution to another in America demands formal
approval in the shape of legal papers that are signed and sealed by a registrar or
dean conveying to the receiving institution your status at the time you left the dismissing institution.
A third powerful reason for American inability to accept the total concept of
Lernfreiheit lies in the ambiguous attitude of the students themselves to the idea.
Were [the American student] compelled tomorrow to live the unconditioned life of
the German university student of fragrant pipe-smoking memory, he would be likely
to exclaim with the poet: "Me this uncharter'd freedom tries."
The fourth difference lies in the constitutions of the American university.
The Continental university often gives only the Ph.D. and confines itself mainly to
what in American parlance is advanced or graduate work ....The responsibility
of the teacher toward the immaturities he faces in elementary instruction is different
from his responsibility toward mature students.
Id. at 226-28,

99. See generally Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 234; Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D.
Ala., N.D. 1970); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
In Keefe, a teacher was discharged for using an article that contained a vulgar term for
an incestuous son. Id. at 360-61. Although the court conceded that the obscenity standards
in the adult community should not determine the standards for what students can read, the
court found that the article was important for the development of the class discussion. Id. at
361-62. The court explained that the chilling effect of proscribing this colloquy was far more
serious than the censorship of a literary work which contained an "obscene" word. Id. at 362.
The foundation of the court's opinion was based on the notion that teachers are free to
teach material that they feel is appropriate to encourage class participation and to stimulate
the individual student's own thought process. Id. The court referred to Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). "Such unwarranted
inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers affects not only those who ...are immediately
before the Court. It has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which
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cludes restrictions which impair the teacher's ability to stimulate the student's
inquiry to investigate matters arising in the natural course of intellectual
inquiry. But that concept has little impact in an environment dedicated
primarily to inculcating traditional values. When government (federal, state,
local or within the academy) infringes upon the teacher's right to question,
let alone the student's, there is a violation of the student's right to learn.
The Supreme Court has by analogy concluded that the right to receive
information is an inherent corollary of the explicit right to free speech. The
right to receive ideas follows from a speaker's right to send the message.
Thus, the Court has observed that "[t]he dissemination of ideas can
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and
consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."'' 1
In the context of the right to learn, the Court has found that the right is
predicated on the student's own exercise of speech and press rights as well
as on political freedom. Thus, the First Amendment would seem to be broad
enough to prevent the state from contracting the spectrum of available
knowledge. Such is not the case. 10 1 The Court has noted that students are
not just passive recipients of only state-ratified communication. 10 2 Rather,
the Supreme Court, in upholding a student's right to receive information, has
to study and to
stressed that "students must always remain free to 1inquire,
3
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding." 0
Students at the lower academy are part of the community in which they
learn. However, the school board, the elected body, determines the educational values that students absorb and to which they adhere. This form of
censorship within the lower academy denies, or at least does not facilitate,
the opportunity for the student to reach out and explore the world so as to
discover new truths and adventures. Rather, the student is spoon-fed the
opinions of those whose views are based on their perception of non-speech
or hate-speech.
It is little wonder that similar censorship is sought at the university level.
In order to avoid confrontation, closed-minded regulations, denying opposing

all teachers ought especially to cultivate and to practice." Id. at 195. According to the Court,
the interaction between teachers and students is a fundamental part of the development of
individuals, not only in their academic setting, but also in the development of the student as
a functional and useful citizen in society. Id. at 195-96. Justice Brennan reaffirmed that
position in Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
868 (1982).
100. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). See
also Pico, 457 U.S. at 853.
101. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
102. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
103. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
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"repulsive" views, are increased. This type of regulated learning discourages
students from understanding a caustic opinion and results in more attacks
upon the minority or disenfranchised. The world of a student can be very
exciting if students are allowed to experiment with new and different
phenomena."° Censorship of any kind tends to cap excitement by limiting
exploration.'05
The belief that change and problem solving can be accomplished
peacefully if there is complete disclosure is an underpinning of democracy
and self-government. 0 6 What emerges from the blizzard of articles on
hate-speech codes is that supporters of codes do not appear to have enough
faith in democratic society to accept opposing views. Unfortunately, support
for restricting the lower academy's search for ideas has received a great boost
by the United States Supreme Court.
C.

Two Decades of Deference: The Evolution of Academic Indoctrination

Noble concepts describing the purpose of education and its value to the
nation have, in reality, never played well in Washington. At best, there has
been a sense of controlled confusion surrounding the evolution of the Court's
analysis and application of a realistic First Amendment protection for the
lower academy. Responding to this confusion, the Court has clarified its
position by almost obliterating students' First Amendment rights in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier10 7 Some commentators consider
Hazelwood the most significant free speech case involving public school
students since the Court decided Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, twenty years ago.'0°

104.
No man can reveal to you aught but that which already lies half asleep in the
dawning of your knowledge.
If he is indeed wise he does not bid you enter the house of his wisdom, but
rather leads you to the threshold of your own mind.
The astronomer may speak to you of his understanding of space, but he
cannot give you his understanding.
The musician may sing to you of the rhythm which is in all space, but he
cannot give you the ear which arrests the rhythm nor the voice that echoes it.
And he who is versed in the science of numbers can tell of the regions of
weight and measure, but he cannot conduct you thither.
For the vision of one man lends not its wings to another man.
KAHLIL GIBRAN, THE PROPHET 56-57 (1923).

105. Censorship comes in many forms. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 37.
106. JEROME FRANK, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGOTHERAPY, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING

105-06 (1959).
107. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
108. See Bruce Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment
Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685.
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An examination of the case law leading up to Hazelwood demonstrates
the Court's constitutional democratization, which has evolved from protecting
students' freedom of expression in Tinker to "denud[ing] high school students
of much of the First Amendment protection that Tinker itself prescribed."' 0 9
As First Amendment protection for students has diminished, the authority of
local school boards and school officials has risen proportionately."'
The deference granted to school administrators and to local school boards
in Hazelwood is not new. This ideology actually was given birth in Tinker.
It is somewhat ironic that Tinker, the case most often cited for the concept
that students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,
is also the origin of the Court's restrictive holdings.
D. The Rise and Fall of Tinker
The Supreme Court first explicitly recognized that public school students
at the secondary level enjoy First Amendment protection in Tinker."'
Tinker concluded that the school authorities could not suppress a student's
right to wear an armband as a symbolic protest against the Vietnam War." 2
Courts have cited Tinker for the self-evident proposition that neither students
nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'' Tinker, however, said little more than that
constitutional rights, otherwise enjoyed outside the academy, are of equal
value within the academy and that the burden is upon the government to
demonstrate otherwise in any particular instance. Courts consistently have
applied the Tinker rationale and its underlying principle to support the notion
that the Constitution limits the authority of school officials over students and
teachers." 4 However, the analysis does not and cannot stop there. First
Amendment jurisprudence is replete with examples of restrictions on rights
where a compelling state interest outweighs the individual's right to protection under the Constitution.
In Tinker, the Court demonstrated that pure political speech that did not
interfere with the rights of others received full constitutional protection in the

109. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that the school
board did not act unconstitutionally by suspending a student following the student's graphic
speech at a school-sponsored assembly); Virgil v. School Bd. of Columbia County, Fla., 677
F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that the school board was within its authority to ban
a humanities textbook).
111. J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press
Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706, 707.
112. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969).
113. Id. at 506.
114. Hafen, supra note 108, at 689.
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academy as well as on the village green."5i Howeyer, that decision also
included an often overlooked recognition of the customary deference courts
accord to school officials. Tinker weighed the state's interest in avoiding
material disruption of class work and an invasion of the rights of others
against the students' right to freedom of expression of their views." 6 Thus,
Tinker does not represent a blanket approval of a student's right to expression
while at school. Rather, in considering the competing interests of the school
administrators and other students, the Court created a balancing test that
grants significant weight to school authorities.
In his majority opinion, Justice Fortas stated, "[T]he Court has repeatedly
emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States
and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards,
' 7
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." 1
From this perspective, even in the early stages of the Court's analysis of
First Amendment applications in the public school setting, the Court utilized
a balancing test. Beginning with Tinker, the Court enunciated these two dissonant priorities which courts confronting these issues have had to reconcile.
The first is the constitutional guarantees of teachers and students. The
second consideration is the Court's deference to the broad authority of local
school officials. Although holding that the policy prohibiting the armbands
violated the students' First Amendment rights, the Tinker Court emphasized
that it would not protect expression which was disruptive or intrusive upon
the rights of others."' This limitation foreshadowed the Court's future
decision in Hazelwood.
E.

Pico and the Inculcation of Local Values

In Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26

v. Pico, 9 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the realm of constitutional protection within the school environment. 20 Pico presented a
challenge to a local school board's authority to remove books, including
Richard Wright's Black Boy and Eldridge Cleaver's Soul on Ice.'2' The
school board asserted that the books were "anti-American, anti-Christian,
anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy."' 22

115. Id.
116. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 509.
119. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (holding that a school board cannot deny students access to ideas
with which the board disagrees by removing books from the library).
120. Hafen, supra note 108, at 690.
121. Id.

122. Pico, 457 U.S. at 857.
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In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan stressed the deference that the
Courts owed to the actions of elected school boards. However, the Court
stated that school boards may not remove books from library shelves simply
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and may not seek
their removal to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion or other matters of opinion."' While seemingly protecting ideas
in the library, the Court provided major support for restrictions. In Pico, the
Court distinguished ideas in the library from ideas in the curriculum at large.
On this point, Justice Brennan said the school board could defend their claim
of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to
inculcate community values.'2 4 Therefore, if any type of academic endeavor is part of the curriculum, then school boards can claim absolute
discretion unless a court finds their motives to be impermissible. Thus,
school boards enjoy apparent immunity so long as their motives are
permissible. It is little wonder that when these same students face a hatespeech code at a university, they automatically accept it. The Supreme Court
reinforced this concept of indoctrination in Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v.
25
Fraser.'
V.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE LOWER ACADEMY AND A
SEPARATE ACADEMIC FREEDOM GUARANTEE

In Fraser,a high school student delivered an election campaign speech
before a high school assembly. The speech contained no graphically-explicit
language. However, the speech did contain sexual metaphors and double
entendres, which school authorities found to be lewd. The authorities
suspended Fraser and removed him from the list of candidates for commencement speaker. 2 6 The Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary action over
the student's claim that the school board violated his freedom of expression.

123. Id. at 872.
124. Id. at 869.
125. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Fraser gave the following speech at a high school assembly in
support of a candidate for student government office:
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm - but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts - he
drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally - he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each and
every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice president - he'll never come between you
and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 686 n.121.
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The Court said, "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial issues in schools' and classrooms must be balanced against the
in teaching students the boundaries of sosociety's countervailing interest
27
cially appropriate behavior."'
The FraserCourt distinguished Tinker on the basis that the penalties in
Fraserwere unrelated to any political viewpoint, and therefore, were permissible. 2 The Court stressed that schools have an inculcative function and
"the constitutional rights of students in public schools are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."'' 29 Furthermore, the
Court included a statement on extracurricular educational activities which
clearly could include Spectrum, the school newspaper involved in Hazelwood.
The FraserCourt said, "The process of educating our youth for citizenship
in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics
class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social
This statement laid the groundwork for the Court's most
order."' 13
restrictive decision.
VI.

THE COMMUNITY VALUES STANDARD OVERWHELMS
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,' the Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment rights of public school students were not
violated when their principal, without conferring with the newspaper staff,
deleted an article about pregnant teenagers and an article about the impact of
divorce from the school newspaper. 3 2 Critics have characterized Hazelwood as the Court using an atom bomb to swat a fly. 33 A close examination illustrates why the Court's analysis and holding were predictable. The
Hazelwood holding was inevitable given that the ruling was based upon the
Court's use of a balancing test and the ever-increasing weight given to
compelling state interests in educating and training young people. Hazelwood, then, falls into line with the Court's previous decisions supporting the
autonomy of local school boards in controlling school-related activities, with
a special emphasis on curriculum control.
Prior to Hazelwood, almost every federal court faced with the question
of student press rights started its analysis with Tinker and found student

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 681.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 682.
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 276.

133. See Abrams & Goodman, supra note 111.
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journalism entitled to extensive First Amendment protection.1 34 In reaching
this conclusion, many courts based their analysis on the "public forum doctrine." 135 This doctrine ensured that once the state established a "forum"
not censor speech or speakers, absent highly
for public expression, it could
136
compelling circumstances.
In deciding whether a school publication is a designated public forum,
courts have focused on whether the publication has been opened to the
general public as a place for expressive activity. 37 The Supreme Court
first applied this test in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Association. 38 In applying this test, the courts have reasoned
that "[t]he Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a
forum generally open to the public even if [the State] was not required to
create the forum in the first place.' 39
Initially, the Hazelwood Court considered the traditional First Amendment analysis. 4 Justice White, writing for the majority, recognized the
First Amendment protection that flowed from Tinker by quoting that
opinion's oft-cited language: "Students in the public schools do not 'shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate. " 14 1 However, he quickly modified that statement by citing Bethel in support of the Court's position that students in school settings
do not enjoy the same rights as adults in other settings and that the school
can "disassociate itself' from vulgar or inappropriate forms of
expression. 141
Justice White proceeded with the public forum question and specifically
rejected the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal's holding that Spectrum was a
public forum for the expression of student opinion. 43 The majority found
that the school board had not intended to establish the paper as a forum for
"indiscriminate use" by the public,'" which was the standard established
in Perry.

134. Id. at 706.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 708.
137. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 (1983) (upholding
a content-neutral regulation restricting access to teachers' mailboxes).
138. Id.
139. R.W. Westling, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: An Administrator's
Authority to Exercise PriorRestraint Over School-Sponsored Publications, 62 TULANE L.
REv. 1467, 1470 (1988) (quoting Perry,460 U.S. at 45).
140. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260.
141. Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 268-69.
144. Id. at 270.
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Once the Court found that the school board created Spectrum as a supervised learning experience for journalism students,145 the paper became a
school-sponsored activity, and therefore, was not entitled to unchecked First
Amendment protection. Even though the paper was circulated beyond the
class to all students and those students were encouraged to respond, the Court
turned to its predictable balancing test. This action was consistent with prior
rulings. The foundation for Hazelwood rested upon the determination that
the school newspaper was part of the curriculum and not a public forum. As
a part of the curriculum, the paper was not entitled to First Amendment
protection generally available to public forums. Ultimately, the Hazelwood
Court applied the Bethel standard, which recognized that school officials
could determine what speech was appropriate in the classroom or at school
assemblies.' 46 Ironically, this standard had its origins in Tinker.
Essentially, Hazelwood made a distinction between the student's right to
write, read and speak freely and a public institution's right not to be
associated with the content of such speech. This distinction may provide a
port in the storm for those seeking First Amendment protection within the
schoolhouse. As one commentator asserts, "The court's opinion does not
stand for the propriety of government censorship. This was not a case of the
State barring a certain kind of speech, or limiting which opinions might be
expressed, but of a school determining the content of something that bears
its official imprimatur."'' 47 By distinguishing between allowing speech and
sponsoring speech, and holding that different standards of First Amendment
protection apply to each, the Hazelwood decision grants high school
administrators the right to police and censor those expressions published
under the school's name as part of the curriculum, thereby, granting the administrators the power to disassociate themselves from viewpoints that might
be "erroneously attributed to the school.' 48
The Hazelwood Court rejected the Tinker standard, which the Court said
applied solely to "personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises."' 4 9 The Court held "school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of
the school" fell outside the Tinker standard.' 5 The school could disassociate itself "from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written,
145. Id. at 268-69.
146. Id. at 276.
147. Dawn P. Danzelsen & Edward G. Reitler, Recent Developments, ConstitutionalLaw:
The FirstAmendment and School Sponsored Activities, I1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 837, 841
(1988).
148. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences," according to the Court. 15 ' Applying this
philosophy, the Court held that: "[E]ducators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'52 All
of these characteristics are subjective. The "unsuitability," however, is the
most limiting or censoring of thought.
Legitimate pedagogical concerns! The Court has constructed a filter, a
powerful control tool to be utilized by officials. Consequently, some commentators now feel that the actions of school officials do not implicate free
speech concerns at all so long as they are taken with a "valid educational
purpose."' 5 3 Determining a valid educational purpose, however, may be
problematic. Justice White, in his statement directed at the principal's
actions in deleting the two pages of administration-perceived "objectionable
text" from Spectrum, found that the principal had acted reasonably. 54 In
making this finding, the Court provided an example of one set of facts that
passed the "valid educational purpose test." Commentators have concluded
that the broadest way to read this example is that "when an educator acts in
good faith to evaluate a situation in terms which focus on quality of work or
on the propriety of materials for dissemination to students in the school environment," the action will be seen as a valid educational purpose.' 5 5
Divorce and pregnancy are deemed inappropriate considerations for high
school reading, study and discussion. Without preparation, practice or training for comparing, contrasting and evaluating ideas, how can students be
teachable at the university?
VII.

ARE THE CONTROLS AT THE LOWER ACADEMY SUBJECT TO
BEING TRANSPLANTED?

Let us be clear, the fact is that academic protection is achieved, if at all,
through First Amendment analysis. There is no constitutionally-approved
academic freedom sub-set. First Amendment protection within the academy
is no different than it is elsewhere. First, the Tinker standard stated that
absent a showing of "material and substantial interference with schoolwork
or discipline," schools could not restrain the First Amendment rights of their
students. 56 Then, Hazelwood expressly limited this right to non-school

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id (emphasis added).
Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
Hafen, supra note 108, at 693.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 274-75.
Hafen, supra note 108, at 694.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969).
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sponsored activities. Given Hazelwood's new standard in the public school
setting, clearly the educator's actions need merely be "reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."' 7
The Supreme Court, however, explicitly reserved the question of whether
a college student's search for knowledge would be subject to the wide-ranging powers granted high school administrators in Hazelwood.158 Thus, it
is possible that lower courts will use this undecided question to prevent
university administrators from using Hazelwood as a green light for
censorship in higher education. 59 Does location determine the light? Or
do age or a magic ritual with paper? Can the key to unlocking these
questions ever be a footnote?

VIII.
A.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MIND

The PreferredPosition Perspective

Philosophers and leaders have enshrined the inviolable right of free
speech. Voltaire passionately phrased his belief in free speech. "I
disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say
it."' 16 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes insisted that the principle of free
thought meant "not free for those who agree with us, but freedom for the
thought that we hate.''
Justice Hugo Black explained the implications of
not enforcing the First Amendment to the fullness of its constitutional extent.
"I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms...
guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate
' 62
or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish."'
Finally, within the context of college conduct codes, Justice William
Brennan, a staunch advocate of the First Amendment, stated that colleges
should abolish all conduct codes. 163 Justice Brennan is correct.' 64 At a
recent symposium on the issue of the legitimacy of university regulations
against hate speech, 165 the overwhelming majority of participants rejected
conduct codes as a technique to regulate civility on campus.' 66 A more
frontal attack is occurring as some students begin looking to the courts for

157. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
158. Id. at 273 n.7.
159. Abrams & Goodman, supra note 111, at 728.
160. STEPHEN G. TALLENTYRE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907).
161. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1924) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
162. Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
163. Hentoff, supra note 41, at A24.
164. But see Herron, supra note 10, at 407.
165. Paul R. Verkuil, Free to Speak, but Willing to Listen and Learn, N.Y. TiMES, Apr.
25, 1990, at A28.
166. Id.
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relief, having found little on campus.' 67 Students argue that campus codes
violate their free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
For example, the University of Connecticut expelled a student for posting
a hand-lettered sign on the door of her dorm room.66 The sign listed
various categories of people unwelcome in the student's room. 69 Among
the enumerated groups were "homos.', 70 The university expelled the
student on the basis of a regulation banning, inter alia, slurs regarding sexual
orientation.17 Under the pressure of the student's First Amendment claim,
the university reinstated her. 72 Besides settling with the student, the
university revised its code to encompass only the most incendiary
speech.173 The prohibited speech then included only those words likely to
provoke an immediate
violent reaction in the context of a direct personal
74
confrontation.
One of the early cases that went to trial involved the campus code of the
University of Michigan. 175 In Doe v. University of Michigan, a biopsychology graduate student challenged the university's campus code. 76 Doe
complained that the code inhibited him from, and would discipline him for,
expressing his views in his academic specialty. 177 Biopsychology is the
study of the biological differences in personality and mental abilities among

167. The ACLU sued to have the University of Wisconsin code declared unconstitutional.
France, supra note 24, at 44.
168. Editorial, How to Handle Hate on Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1989, at A30.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
176. Id. at 858. The key part of the University of Michigan's Policy on Discrimination and
Discriminatory Harassment of Students in the University Environment states that in
"educational and academic centers" persons are subject to discipline for:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or
personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an
individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University
sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety.
Id. at 856.
The University of Michigan Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment
was passed unanimously on April 14, 1988 and became effective on May 31, 1988. Id.
177. Id. at 858.
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the sexes and races. 7 8 Doe charged that the university's policy had a
chilling effect on the open discourse of this controversial theory. 79
Examining the plaintiff's claim that the policy was unconstitutional, the
court held that the policy was overbroad and vague. 8 Addressing both
aspects of unconstitutionality, the court first described all of the types of
speech that are not entitled to the fullest protection of the First
Amendment.' 8' The court included obscenity, libel and fighting words
among the types of speech that may be regulated. 82 Furthermore, the court
stated that although it could not regulate pure speech that falls outside these
exceptions, the university could constitutionally impose time, place or manner
restrictions upon campus speech. 83 However, the court qualified that statement by noting that the university could not prohibit certain speech simply
because it disagreed with the ideas or messages that the speaker sought to
convey. 184
The court also addressed the overbreadth claim. 85 The court, in part,
focused upon Papish v. University of Missouri.186 "[T]he mere dissemination of ideas - no matter how offensive to good taste - on a state
university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of common decency.'' 187 Based upon this reasoning, the court determined that "the state may
not prohibit broad classes of speech, some of which may indeed be legitimately regulable, if in so doing a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected [conduct] is also prohibited."'' 88
This was the fundamental
infirmity of the Policy. The court found that the University of Michigan
Code could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.' 89
After finding the policy unconstitutional for reasons of overbreadth, the
court focused upon the heart of its attack: vagueness. 9 Applying the
vagueness test, the court found that the words "stigmatize" and "victimize"
were unconstitutionally vague because people of ordinary intelligence must

178. Id.
179. Id. at 858.
180. Id. at 866-67.
181. Id. at 862-63.
182. Id. at 862.
183. Id. at 863. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
184. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
185. Id. at 864.
186. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
187. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864 (quoting Papish, 410 U.S. at 670).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 867. The court stated that "looking at the plain language of the Policy, it was
simply impossible to discern any limitation on its scope or any conceptual distinction between
unprotected and protected conduct." Id.
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necessarily guess at their meaning. 9 Simply put, vagueness "'inhibit[s]
freedoms affirmatively protected by the constitution. "' 9 2 Vague rules are
the stuff of the police state. The court found that the university's policy
created a real and substantial chilling effect. 9 3
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to test the conclusions of the Doe
court in a non-academic speech case, R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota.194 In R.A. V the Court did what many universities had not been
willing to do, recognized a free trade in ideas zone, even though in this
instance the idea was the reprehensible act of burning a cross.' 95 The
Court rejected the invitation posited by the city to create a new low-value
category for hate speech. 196 In doing so, the Court refused to lower the
tolerance point for protected speech.'97

The ordinance at issue in R.A. V,

as construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, forbade fighting words based
on characteristics that have come to define hate speech: "race, color, creed,
religion, or gender."' 98
The St. Paul ordinance was designed to convey a message of understanding by the government of the indignities that minorities are forced to endure
because of, among other actions, hate speech. 9' If couched in general
words that prohibit fighting words, this message of understanding would be
lost. The state argued that government must address bias-motivated speech
in order to ensure dialogue, reconciliation and peace. 200
Besides conveying a message of support to minorities, the state concluded that the statute is not prohibiting speech uttered in the spirit of the marketplace; 20 1 in short, that the traditional marketplace rationale for the First
Amendment is not served where hate speech is unregulated.
The R.A. V Court rejected the invitation to create a new low-value cate-

191. Id. at 866 (citing Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,607 (1973)). The court stated
that "both of these terms are general and elude precise definition," and that "the terms of the
Policy were so vague that their enforcement would violate the due process clause." Id. at 867.
192. Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)).
193. Id. (citing the test in Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
194. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
195. Id. at 396.
196. Id. at 381. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. REV. 124 (1992).
197. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
198. Id. at 380; cf., Amar, supra note 196.
199. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990). Consider, for example, Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), wherein speech becomes unprotected action when the crime
itself resulted from the victim's race, religion, gender or the like. This is an entirely different
matter. See also ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, 1994 HATE CRIME LAWS, A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE (1994).

200. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 394-95.

201. See id. at 393.
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gory for hate speech.2" 2 In fact, the Court increased the scrutiny given to
regulations of previously denominated categories of low value, reasoning that
those categories are not "entirely invisible" to the First Amendment.2 3
Regulation within low-value categories must be done for reasons related to
why the category exists, not for any non-prescribable message incident to
them. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found unconstitutional not just
2 04
the statute at issue in R.A. V
R.A. V ' increased scrutiny of regulations of low-value speech is in conformity with the absolutists. One First Amendment absolutist calls for a
view of the First Amendment that considers the "pathological perspective. 20' 5 This theory stands for the proposition that the overriding objective
at all times must be to equip the First Amendment to do the maximum
service. 206 Tftu
If thus eequipped, the First Amendment will sustain those
historical periods when intolerance of unpopular ideas is prevalent.2 7
Therefore, the First Amendment must be targeted and prepared for the most
threatening scenarios. 208
This analysis of the First Amendment is suggested from the very nature
of the Amendment. Unlike other Amendments, the First Amendment is quite
clear in its language; it maintains a preservative function.2 9 It is, after all,
a preferred guarantee.
Justifications for the infringement of other
constitutionally protected rights and liberties are usually inadequate to justify
restrictions on freedom of speech or press.21 0
The importance of the First Amendment lies with its purpose of perpetuating the republican form of government.2 ' In a democratically pluralistic
society, the First Amendment is first among equals. Freedom of speech is
2 12
the paradigmatic liberty through which citizens participate in democracy.
Free speech is therefore essential to the basic structure and relationship
of the political community. 21 3 Consequently, a [state] campus conduct code
202. Id. at 382-83.
203. Id. at 383.
204. Id. at 386.
205. Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449 (1985). The author defines "pathology" as a shift in fundamental attitudes and
perceptions among groups whose judgments have an important influence on the general level
and vigor of debate and inquiry. Id. at 451.
206. Id. at 449.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 450.
209. Id.
210. David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZo L. REv. 445, 455
(1987).
211. Id. at 448-49.
212. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approach to the First
Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 392.

213. Id.
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that interferes with the First Amendment necessarily threatens the fragile
democratic balance.
B.

Critique of the PreferredPosition Perspective

There are difficulties with the preferred position perspective. Indeed,
some of the premises upon which the preferred position rests are tenuous.
The absolutist's position does not appear to consider the universal condemnation of prejudice, which is a violation of human rights and basic dignity. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes not
only entitlement to equal protection against discrimination, but also states that
''any incitement [fighting words] to such discrimination" is a violation of the
Declaration.214 In Beauharnaisv. Illinois the United States Supreme Court
at one point recognized a similar prohibition on public acts that discriminate
against a group.21 5
Make no mistake, the essence of hate speech is that one group believes
it is superior to another based upon immutable characteristics.2 16 Consequently, those that espouse this view believe that they can demean, abuse,
and subordinate "selected victim groups. 217 The quest to limit the rights
of those perceived to be in the "selected victim groups" manifests itself in
verbal attacks and abuse, which often result in mental and physical violence.218
This multi-faceted violence has caused some to reconsider the preferred
position of the First Amendment, arguing that this "historical connection of
all the tools of racism is a record against which to consider a legal response
to racist [and other hate] speech. '2'9 Thus, the magnitude of the negative
and unknown effects of hate speech demands a reexamination of equal protection interests not to mention other constitutional rights and liberties equally as compelling in remedying hate speech.22 °
In addition to policy concerns which measure the fundamental value of
constitutional interests, some argue that a preferred position for the First

214. UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948). The
full text of the relevant portion of the Declaration states: "All are equal before the law and
are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any
incitement to such discrimination." Id. Of course, the declaration is speaking to the fightingwords doctrine which is also recognized by most absolutists. Id.
215. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
216. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2332.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2335.
220. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids
"badges of slavery" for both public and private parties. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
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Amendment rests upon a faulty or false assumption. That assumption is the
This
American jurisprudential myth of the marketplace of ideas. 21
concept, idealizing the merits of competing ideas and robust debate, is rooted
in the utilitarian movement of English philosophers such as John Stuart
Mill. 222 Justice Holmes is credited with introducing the concept of a free
marketplace of ideas in his dissent in Abrams v. United States223 when he
stated that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market .... ,22' The marketplace model
assumes that people will eschew false assertions. 22 5 Accepting this assumption as true, the most meritorious aspect of the marketplace model is that it
avoids the danger of officially-sanctioned truth. 226 This unrealistic assumption about human nature tends to diminish the effectiveness of the marketplace theory. The success of the marketplace theory requires a citizenry
"capable of making determinations that are both sophisticated and intricately
rational. 227 Societal trends have not vindicated the marketplace model's
faith in the rationality of the human mind.228 Citizens appear to act without
reason or full understanding.
Without the requisite guarantee of a rational populace, an ominous danger
exists. If people are unequipped to distinguish truth from falsity, then there
is the dangerous potential for the dissemination of completely false information under the sanctity of the First Amendment. 229 If this is the case, does
it not reflect upon the educational process? 230 Are students provided with
the opportunities to learn, think and reflect, as well as, dispute and question
ideas? The failure is not in the marketplace of ideas theory, but in many
school systems where there is an unwillingness to teach people the basic
tools of thinking. This results in both government and its citizens being
blinded by the information highway and being poorly prepared when
confronted with opportunities to think. Could it be that the computer will be

221. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
222. Id. at 3.
223. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes' dissent hinged on his
belief that the defendants' call for a socialist revolution presented no clear and present danger.
Therefore, the best way to refute the defendants was through public debate. See also Ingber,
supra note 221, at 3.
224. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. From Justice Holmes' perspective, a properly functioning
marketplace of ideas ultimately assures the proper evolution of society, wherever that evolution might lead. Ingber, supra note 221, at 3.
225. Ingber, supra note 221, at 3.
226. Id. at 7. As discussed hereinafter, the marketplace model permits the converse danger
of the dissemination of false doctrine. Id.

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
Id.
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the ultimate downfall of the First Amendment?
C.

The Revisionist Perspective

While the First Amendment's preferred position advocates argue for the
right to exercise free speech, even hate speech, there is a considerable body
of legal scholarship, the revisionists, that favors censorship of what they
define as hate speech. 23' These academicians add intellectual support to the
emotional outrage that hate speech provokes.232 The First Amendment
revisionists, in order to justify the regulation of speech, do not claim that
campus codes are not content regulations. Nor do they contend that the
traditional categories of low-value speech, to which the First Amendment affords less protection, require expansion. 23 3 "This stretching [of the First
Amendment exceptions] ultimately weakens the First Amendment fabric,
creating neutral holes that remove protection for many forms of speech.
Setting aside the worst forms of racist speech for special treatment is a non234
neutral, value-laden approach that will better preserve free speech.
Instead, the revisionists charge that the Court's practice of permitting
content-based restrictions on speech that falls into one of a few recognized
exceptions ignores legitimate countervailing interests.235 Rather than
attempting to focus upon new exceptions to the First Amendment, the revisionists attack the fundamental nature of the First Amendment.236
While others insist upon a value-neutral constitutional interpretation, the
revisionists advocate a so-called realistic approach. 237 The revisionists
maintain that traditional First Amendment analysis is not value-neutral at
all.238 Rather, because the First Amendment was constructed by, is applied
by and is interpreted by property-holding white males, there is necessarily a
value system operating throughout First Amendment jurisprudence.239
Based upon the historical context in which the First Amendment has developed, that value system reflects the exclusive dimension of the men in power

231. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2321-22.
232. Irving R. Kaufman, Nibble at Freedom, and Risk Losing It All; First Amendment:
Tools Dragged Out to Stifle Hateful Speech Would Disturb Bedrock Principles of Free
Expression, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1990, at B7.
233. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2357.
234. Id.
235. Martha Minow, Recent Case: FirstAmendment - Racist and Sexist Expression on
Campus - Court Strikes Down University Limits on Hate Speech - Doe v. University of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), 103 HARv. L. REv. 1397 (1990).
236. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2321.
237. Id.
238. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 175 (1982).
239. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2322. This does not bode well for the King James or any
other version of the Bible!
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at the time. 240 The argument would seem to be that free speech values do
not exist within a political vacuum.24 In order to create a more equitable
foundation and to function more effectively for the interests of a larger constituency, the First Amendment must be examined from a multi-faceted
perspective.242 First Amendment reconsideration in light of more heterogeneous concerns is important because, "freedom of expression as defined by
women and minority groups looks different than freedom of expression de'
fined by others."243
In fashioning a new method of First Amendment
analysis, the revisionists argue that because of prejudice inherent within
traditional First Amendment analysis, women and minorities deserve special
treatment.2 4
The revisionist's value-laden approach is particularly appealing in the
campus setting. As the President of Emory University noted, "We misconstrue the nature of the university when we operate as if it were value-neutral.
Educators are by definition professors of value., 245 Furthermore, the
university is a forum for passing on to the next generation not only
information but also the habits and manners of society.24 It seems from
this argument that the university is no different than the secondary or
elementary school or society at large since its purpose is to promote not only
free expression but also an environment conductive to learning and mutual
engagement.247 And when censorship is necessary, it is employed. When
someone or some group is the target of hate speech, they are effectively
silenced, frightened and incapable of participating fully in campus life.248
By censoring some speech and preventing intimidation, the revisionists hope
to facilitate the exchange of more diverse ideas except, of course, those they
249
consider to be the wrong ones.
The revisionist's attack upon the fundamental nature of the First Amend-

240. Id.
241. France, supra note 24, at 44.
242. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2322. Matsuda's theory embraces the perspective of those
she terms as "outsiders." Matsuda uses the term "outsider" instead of "minority" because the
latter belies the numerical significance of the constituencies typically excluded from jurisprudential discourse. Id. at 2322 n.15.
243. France, supra note 24, at 44 (comments of Kathleen Mahoney, a Canadian law
professor). Similarly, Stanford law professor Charles Lawrence notes that in considering the
First Amendment and hate speech, people must listen to the victims. Jon Wiener, FreeSpeech
for Campus Bigots, THE NATION, Feb. 26, 1990, at 273.
244. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2380-81.
245. James T. Laney, Why Tolerate Campus Bigots?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 1990, at A35.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See generally Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and
Universities: 0 Say Does That Star-SpangledFirstAmendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 WAYNE
L. REV. 1 (1993).
249. Kaufinan, supra note 232, at B7.
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ment stems, in part, from inherent flaws in general First Amendment philosophy, notably, the conception of the marketplace of ideas. 250 The ideal
that each person possesses the opportunity to expound his/her views has
failed.2 5 ' Racism, sexism and other variations of prejudice have proved
intransigent in the private sector. 5 2 Country club and rotary networks have
created a society where a limited few have true access to the private marketplace of ideas. The difficulty here is that the revisionists want to censor
private ideas, intolerant though they might be. The revisionists cannot identify any official policy protecting racism or discrimination; the "problem has
2' 53
become primarily a problem of attitude, of mind, not of official policy.
When First Amendment absolutists invoke the marketplace model, the
traditional emphasis on the individuality of constitutional rights succumbs to
the superior goal of group benefit. 2' The aggregate benefit that this society receives from the promotion of free speech, as well as free press,
justifies the marketplace model. 255 The marketplace theory 56 values not
the benefit of free speech to the individual, but the benefit of free speech to
society.

7

The marketplace model focuses on society and not the speaker who relegates free speech to an instrumental function. 258 Free speech is valued for
its ability to facilitate the progress of society, rather than any innate value in
and of itself.259 When free speech is viewed as such, limited government
regulation becomes more palatable, the purpose usually being to maximize
societal benefits. 260 Thus, the absolutist's marketplace theory actually justifies the revisionist theory that some government regulation of free speech is
necessary. At some point, the First Amendment will break under the
rejection of tolerance of hated ideas. If society is to benefit from the
eradication of hate speech, it must be accomplished through education not
censorship or indoctrination.
One of the first voices heralding the abolition of tolerance of hate speech
was heard in the early 1980s when the term "words that wound" was
coined.26' In considering a legal remedy for words that wound, hate speech

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See Minow, supra note 235.
See Hiers, supr:a note 248.
Id.
Bollinger, The Open Minded Soldier, supra note 6, at 58.
Ingber, supra note 221, at 4.
Id.
See generally BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
See generally Delgado, supra note 238.
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began to be analogized to the intolerant act of producing obscenity.2 62 The
Supreme Court's reasoning for why states are constitutionally permitted to
regulate obscenity became instructive when seeking similar reasoning in
calling for the regulation of hate speech.263
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slanton,2 4 the Supreme Court articulated
several reasons why states can subject obscenity to regulation. First, the
Court stated that there is "at least ... an arguable correlation between obscenity and crime. 2 6s The parallel seemed to be that hate speech is in contravention with the goals of antidiscrimination laws and the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment. 266 Second, Paris concluded that states can regulate obscenity because the nation and the states have a right to maintain a decent
society.16 By analogy, the revisionists argue that the regulation of hate
speech is within the government's interest in maintaining a "decent society., 268 By that logic, any intolerant act can be forbidden by government
in the name of a "decent society."
While these reasons constitute the legal justification for regulating hate
speech, other revisionists have stressed equitable and policy considerations.269 The revisionists believe that content-based and viewpoint-based
limits upon speech actually promote equality in the exercise of free
speech.270 The revisionists assert that "free speech is meaningless to people
who do not have equality." 271 In this context, equality is a necessary
precondition to the exercise of free speech.272 Therefore, sanctions against
hate speech may actually promote a more equitable exercise of free speech,
especially among some of the victims of hate speech.273 By eliminating the
chilling effect that hate speech has upon minority commentary, the
revisionists believe they are actually promoting free speech.274

262. Id. at 177.
263. Id.
264. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
265. Id. at 58.
266. Delgado, supra note 238, at 178.
267. ParisAdult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 59-60 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199
(1964) (Warren, J., dissenting)).
268. Delgado, supra note 238, at 178.
269. See generally Matsuda, supra note 1.
270. France, supra note 24, at 44.
271. Id. (comments of Marl Matsuda).
272. Id. (comments of Charles Lawrence).
273. Kaufman, supra note 232, at B7.
274. Id. See Ray Washington, UF's Sexual Harassment Workshops Expand, GAINESVILLE
SuN, April 19, 1995, at 1. Starting in the fall of 1995, graduate teaching assistants at the
University of Florida will be expected to attend sexual harassment workshops and mini
conferences. Id. Jacquelyn Hart, Assistant Vice President for Affirmative Action, stated,
"The more people who go through these sessions, we believe, the more likely our campus will
be free from sexually harassing behavior." Id.
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The revisionist's policy considerations start with the basic contention that
law formation is largely the product of value judgments. 275 Therefore, adherence to doctrinal absolutism implies that the law, perhaps unintentionally,
supports hate speech.276 Juxtaposed with this implication is the fact that
in the United States, society expresses its moral judgments through the
law.277 The First Amendment not only justifies the absence of laws against
hate speech, but also serves to excuse the lack of a systemic response to this
shameful social phenomena.278 As one commentator has suggested, "by
donning blinders that block our equality interests from judicial consideration
courts... risk perpetuating discrimination. 279 Thus, because "any definition of rights necessarily defined the rights of others," this, in essence, has
protected the rights of others to be free from oppression.2 80
The revisionists charge that since the First Amendment does not consider
the interests of all those involved, it becomes a tool of domination, not
liberation.28 ' Under this scheme, society's outsiders bear the burden of the
supposed greater good that free speech promotes. 282 Failure to examine
competing equality interests 2" especially isanomalous in First Amendment
jurisprudence, a realm of constitutional law premised on the marketplace
notion that sound conclusions are the-product of thorough exploration of all
cogent points. 284
In the final analysis, the revisionist's perspective is rooted not only in
natural justice, but also in government control of acceptable private political
expression. The moral arguments that the revisionists construct to justify the
regulation of hate speech are most compelling. They favor regulating hate
speech as defined by the government, "not because it isn't really speech, not
because it falls within a hoped-for neutral exception, but because it is
wrong., 28 5 As one commentator has written, "failing to notice another's

275. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2379.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Minow, supra note 235, at 1399.
280. Balkin, supra note 212, at 381. Balkin compares the free market arguments that
conservatives adopted and perverted in the Lochner era with the potential perversion that First
Amendment absolutism presents. This perversion is revealed as Klansmen and cigarette
advertisers join staunch First Amendment advocates as defenders of the faith. Balkin calls this
phenomenon "ideological drift." Id. at 393, 423.
281. Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 459.
282. Id. at 472.
283. Id. This result demonstrates the perversion that Balkin's "ideological drift" produces.
See generally Balkin, supra note 212.
284. Minow, supra note 235, at 1399.
285. Matsuda, supra note 1,at 2380.
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pain is an act with significance. 286
The argument continues that in addition to the psychological trauma that
government indifference inflicts,287 analytically dismissing the claims of
hate speech victims as outside doctrinal protection sends a dual message.288
The victims receive a message of marginalization, which compounds their
initial injury.289 Simultaneously, denying victims redress signals approval
to the perpetrators, perhaps prompting further acts of bigotry.290
D. Critique of the Revisionist Perspective
While the revisionists accuse the absolutists of "romanticizing" the First
Amendment,29 ' the revisionist position not only romanticizes the moral
imperative, but also, more dangerously, leaves the judgment to the
The revisionist's doctrine emphasizes
authoritative decision maker.
governmental restructuring of the First Amendment to accommodate an
acknowledged evil. 292 As other evils are acknowledged, they too will be
dealt with in a similar manner, and the flexibility of the First Amendment
will accommodate all who fear the marketplace of ideas. The fact is, what
the revisionists propose is the promotion of a hate speech-free society by
abrogating the exercise of all other conflicting, constitutionally-mandated
rights.293
To say that society can solve its problems by suppressing the beliefs or
opinions of private citizens is inconsistent. 294 The resulting freedom will
be for me, but not for thee. The revisionists have forgotten that the First
Amendment serves to protect the minority against majoritarian impulses to
suppress the airing of unpopular views. Censoring speech that the majority
of citizens abhor is antithetical to this free society.
Controlling expression on the grounds that it promotes hate is a
dangerous method for achieving societal goals. The danger exists in the
uncertainties of the proposition. The revisionists posit that the victim's
perspective is the standard for judging what expression is damaging.295
The very subjectivity of this standard invites abuse. Moreover, this
subjectivity entails a degree of ambiguity that jeopardizes due process.

286. France, supra note 24, at 44.
287. Minow, supra note 235, at 1399.
288. Id. at 1400.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. France, supra note 24, at 48 (comments of Mari Matsuda).
292. See generally France, supra note 24; Matsuda, supra note 1.
293. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963).
294. Id.
295. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2368.
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The revisionist's theory includes other aspects that are objectionable from
both a constitutional and social policy perspective. First, some revisionists
claim that hateful verbal attacks upon dominant group members are permissible.296 The revisionists rationalize this position by claiming that "retreat
and reaffirmation of personhood are more easily attained for historically nonsubjugated group members."2' 97 However, this position cuts against the
philosophical foundation upon which the revisionists theory rests. While the
revisionists sanctify diverse values and the deleterious effects of hate speech,
apparently, they apply these principles selectively.
Another objectionable aspect of revisionists theory is found in the attempts to promote cultural diversity. The revisionists quarrel with the presence of books which contain what they perceive as hate speech. 291 This
objection even extends to works where such hate speech is used to illustrate
the ugly reality of a prejudicial society.' 99 For example, revisionists
criticize the use of literature, such as Mark Twain's, which employs hate
speech to expose the ignorance of a racist society.'°°
While schools in the United States are admittedly deficient in nonWestern course materials, the elimination of Eurocentric materials is a
dangerous precedent. Censorship goes beyond just the regulation of speech
to encroach upon the areas of artistic integrity and individual interpretation.
The potential danger that someone may suffer from the artistic use of hate
speech cannot justify interference with the right of an individual to express
ideas and opinions free from restraints.
The revisionists recognize some of the flaws in their theories. They
have, therefore, constructed various explanations to harmonize some of the
glaring inconsistencies that undercut the credibility of their theories. For
example, application of pure revisionist thought would deem Zionism as
racist.30' Therefore, speech that advocated Zionism would be subject to
regulation. To avoid this consequence, the revisionists argue that racial
hostility within the Zionist context is the product of historical persecution.30 2 Analysis of Zionist hate speech must be examined in a particular
context. 30 3 Thus:
If a Zionist's expression of anger includes a statement of generic
white supremacy and persecution, the speaker chooses to ally with
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.

303. Id.

2357.
2361.
2369.
2363.
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a larger, historically dominant group, and the victim's privilege
should not apply. On the other hand, angry, survivalist expression,
arising out of the Jewish experience of persecution and without resort
to the rhetoric of generic white supremacy, is protected under the
contextualized approach. 3°4
The "victim's privilege"3" 5 is the revisionist's convenient way of justifying
the hard case. However, this rationale fails to consider hate speech by those
in a victim's group; they theoretically also enjoy the "victim's privilege."
This inconsistency reveals the strained logic in the revisionist attempt to
reconcile the incongruous results that their doctrine produces.
IX.

AN EGALITARIAN PARADIGM FOR HATE SPEECH

"To be weighed in the balance are, on the one hand, the extent to which
communicative activity is in fact inhibited; and, on the other
hand, the val3°6
ues, interests, or rights served by enforcing the inhibition."
At the outset, it is important to note that the constitutional solutions
apply only to state universities. Under the doctrine of state action,30 7
private universities do not fall within the ambit of the following regulations.
The basis of a constitutionally permissible campus conduct code starts with
the Supreme Court's assertion that, "[T]he First ...Amendment ha[s] never

been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses. 30 8
Constitutional consideration of hate speech rests upon the proposition that
not every action carries a message. Hate speech shares many characteristics
with what the Supreme Court has deemed low-value speech. 3°9 Hate
speech is somewhat like libel because it is untrue.31 ° Unfortunately, that
is a value judgment that might differ between speaker and recipient. Hate
speech qualifies under the fighting words doctrine because it tends to provoke
an aggressive reaction in the victim. 311

Once again, a value judgment is

304. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

305. Id.
306. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 979 (2d ed. 1988).

307. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
308. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19.
309. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (libel);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity). In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 484,479 (1957), the Court
observed that obscenity was "utterly without redeeming social importance."
310. See, e.g., Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 763 (where a false credit report constituted
libel).
311. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
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utilized if hate speech, as with obscenity, is said to possess no artistic, literary, scientific or social value.3" 2 Furthermore, the degree of tolerance is
important in an understanding of impermissible speech.
In cases of libel, fighting words and obscenity, the Supreme Court has
permitted content-based regulation because these forms of speech demand
less, if any, First Amendment protection;" 3 hence, the First Amendment is
312. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
313. There is no question that libelous statements directed at individuals are outside First
Amendment protection. Hate speech codes, however, punish statements against classes of
people, such as Blacks, Jews or Orientals. The constitutionality of the codes thus depends on
whether laws punishing group libel are permissible. The constitutionality of group libel laws
is uncertain. Most courts require injury to an individual before a libel claim can be made.
However, the Supreme Court did uphold the constitutionality of a group libel statute in
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Beauharnaisarose when the petitioner was convicted under an Illinois statute banning
speech which, inter alia, "exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots." Id. at 251
(quoting ILL. REV. STAT. § 224a (1949)). Beauharnais authorized the distribution of leaflets
which urged segregation of whites from blacks. Id. at 252. Specifically, the leaflets said, "If
persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro
will not unite us, then the aggressions ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the
negro, SURELY WILL." Id. at 276.
The Court upheld Beauharnais' conviction. Id. at 266. Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the majority, said the statute was not unconstitutional simply because it punished group libel.
Id. at 263.
But if an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal sanctions,
we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance directed at a defined
group, unless we can say that this is a wilful and purposeless restriction unrelated
to the peace and well-being of the State.
Id. at 258.
The Court rejected the idea that the statute should be subject to First Amendment
scrutiny because it regulated the content of speech. Id. at 266. Since libel fell outside the
protection of the Constitution, Justice Frankfurter reasoned there was no need to apply the
"clear and present danger" test. Id.
Justice Frankfurter did not focus on whether the statements banned by the Illinois
statute should be considered libelous in the first place. He said that as long as Illinois had defined libel in a way related to the "peace and well-being" of the State, it was an unreviewable
legislative judgment. Id. at 258.
Twelve years after Beauharnais,the Supreme Court handed down the landmark libel
decision of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). New York Times arose when
a public official (Sullivan) in Montgomery, Alabama, sued the Times over an advertisement
that appeared in its pages. Id. at 256. The advertisement accused Sullivan of racist,
oppressive police practices against Blacks while Sullivan served as the Montgomery police
commissioner. Id. at 256-58.
The Court framed the issue as whether the Alabama law of libel sufficiently
safeguarded First Amendment and free press rights. Id. at 265. Writing for the majority,
Justice Brennan concluded it did not. Id. at 292.
In Beauharnais, the Court had decided that the way a state defined libel was subject
to rationality review. Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 266. But in New York Times, Justice Brennan
rejected the idea that a state could avoid a First Amendment inquiry by merely defining
categories of speech as libelous. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292.
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not tolerant of platform protection for what is deemed hate speech. In the
case of hate speech, there exist not only compelling reasons to regulate, but
also even more compelling reasons to ignore regulation. While true hate
speech is virtually lacking in content, one question is: Who censors the ideas
and who protects the utterances?
The regulation of hate speech void of content must be distinguished from
the regulation of other forms of prejudicial expression. Hate speech is
complex, involving racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. It encompasses
theories of superiority such as the white man's burden,314 Herbert Spencer's
Social Darwinism3' 5 and the Michigan plaintiff's theories of biop-

In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to
give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of
state law. . . . [L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations. It must be measured by standards which satisfy the First Amendment.
Id. at 269 (citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)).
In essence, Justice Brennan said state libel laws would no longer be subject to the
rationality review of Beauharnais. A First Amendment analysis would be applied instead.
New York Times placed much more stringent restrictions on states' abilities to define libel law
than Beauharnais. The statute from Beauharnaiscould not survive under the higher standard
of analysis.
It can, however, be argued that the higher standard of review announced in New York
Times does not necessarily make the Beauharnaisstatute unconstitutional. The categories of
speech prohibited in the two cases were arguably different.
The statute at issue in New York Times had the potential to stifle criticism of public officials and their conduct. Some might say that the Alabama statute in New York Times failed
strict scrutiny because it infringed on highly valued First Amendment discourse. By contrast,
the Beauharnais statute might withstand review because that statute banned only hateful
epithets which do not further the First Amendment's high purpose. I believe history suggests
that New York Times settled the matter; the Beauharnais statute probably could not withstand
constitutional analysis today.
As for obscenity, hate speech and obscenity do have some similarities. Both arguably
are low-value speech, and both can be dehumanizing. For that reason, it might be suggested
that hate speech law, like obscenity, be made a First Amendment exception.
However, there are also some important differences. Obscenity can be called low-value
speech because it rarely contains serious political messages. Hate speech, on the other hand,
is often tangled with political messages. The argument that hate speech effectively eliminates
the possibility of reply speech is too broad to be considered seriously. The Supreme Court
does not use it as a rationale for speech regulation.
Some might say that hate-speech law operates like obscenity law, but that suggestion
has little appeal given the confused state of obscenity. The Court never had to create an
obscenity exception. It existed in state and common law. Hate speech law, by contrast,
would require the Court to undertake the daunting task of creating a new First Amendment
exception.
314. "Take up the White Man's burden/send forth the best ye breed ......
OxFORD
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 401:11 (4th ed. 1992).
315. HERBERT SPENCER, PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY (1865). "It cannot but happen ... that
those will survive whose functions happen to be most nearly in equilibrium with the modified
aggregate of external forces . . . ." Id. at 64.
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sychology.316 Whether we like it or not, these theories convey ideas, which
no matter how distasteful, enjoy First Amendment protection." 7 The
difference between these repulsive theories and hate speech is the difference
between the statements "You're inferior because ... " and "You don't have
a right to exist. '' 318 Clearly, the former sentence conveys an idea, while the
latter does not.
I believe Professor Tribe's narrowly-drawn law that would punish the use
of hate speech when it involves the intentional infliction of psychic trauma
would pass constitutional muster.319 Professor Tribe argues that "the First
Amendment need not sanctify the deliberate infliction of. . . words that
cause hurt just by their being uttered and heard."32 Thus, fighting words
used with the specific intent to inflict pain rather than to convey an idea
would not and do not under existing case law enjoy the full protection of the
First Amendment.3 2'
The problem with regulating hate speech is one of overbreadth and intolerance of speech the government finds hurtful. That was the case in the University of Michigan's code.322 The statute was overbroad because it swept
within its parameters constitutionally-protected speech.323 Perhaps the
determination of concepts such as "overbreadth" when it involves a career,
should be left to the appropriate governmental decision-maker as it finally
was in Doe. This would include courts but not universities.
Fashioning a conduct code against hate speech that does not violate the
overbreadth and toleration doctrine324 involves extremely complex reconciliation, respecting the difference between the twin principles of regulating
conduct and regulating the exposition of ideas. Many universities have
demonstrated unwillingness to adopt such an unpopular position. Understand
that hate speech does not constitute the overt, state-sponsored misconduct
prohibited under federal legislation, for example, the Civil Rights Act of
1964.325 Hate speech is usually the act of students, sometimes staff and
their family; such action is not condoned by the state. But that does not
mean that it should be prohibited. The First Amendment does not necessarily

316. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1989). See further
discussion in supra note 176.
317. See, e.g., Shaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
"[C]ommunication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas...
are within the protection of First Amendment." Id. at 632.
318. Laney, supra note 245, at A35.
319. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Fending Off "FightingWords," LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1990, at 19.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
323. Id. at 868.

324. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City, 487 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
325. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq. (1984).
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prohibit this type of conduct. 326 Hate speech, as usually defined, falls between two extremes: limited levels of conduct no longer tolerated as speech
and constitutionally-permissible expression of ideas.327 Regulating hate
speech will continue to fail because campus conduct codes tend to alter the
level of tolerance to the chilling point of nonexistence, hence censorship.
Universities cannot or will not narrowly tailor their codes to respect competing constitutional principles. If they do, their codes become redundant.
Therefore, in order to take a stand some universities have refused to recognize that they are in the words and ideas business. Words and ideas must
first turn into action and that action must be aimed at fighting or physical
injury before the First Amendment will tolerate regulation.
The University of Michigan case may provide some help in formulating
a code that respects these competing constitutional interests. The court in
Doe stated that to be overbroad a statute must sweep into its ambit a "substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct."32 The United States
Supreme Court also has noted that the quantum necessary for a statute to be
overbroad is substantial:
[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible
applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an
overbreadth challenge.... [T]here must be a realistic danger that
the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protection of parties not before the Court for it to be
facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.329
Thus, even though there is a delicate balance between permissible speech
and prohibited conduct, codes regulating prohibited speech-action conduct
need to be well-tailored.330 Speech cannot be suppressed.
X.

FORMULATING A CONSTITUTIONAL CAMPUS CONDUCT CODE

If public statements are any indication of dissatisfaction, students appear
to have felt more chilled by the speech codes than have faculty or administrators. In April 1994, student leaders from some thirty-eight colleges
and universities across the nation met at Harvard University to discuss issues
related to free speech. They ratified what has since become known as The
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Cambridge Resolution.33' It states:
We believe that speech codes and broadly drawn codes of conduct,
no matter how benevolent in purpose, are inimical to the life of the
university, and that no matter how plausible their rationale, have the
ultimate effect of repressing views that do not fit the prevailing
campus orthodoxy, and that students should have the freedom to
think, write, and speak the truth as they see it, without fear of
intimidation, coercion, or the threat of punishment.332
In the spring of 1995, the University of Florida Student Senate passed
The Cambridge Resolution, as did all the other institutions except for the
University of Texas.333 In The Cambridge Resolution, Benno Schmidt
stated that "the university has a fundamental mission which is to search for
the truth" and that it should be a place where people have "the right to speak
the unspeakable
and think the unthinkable and challenge the unchallen33 4
geable.
Although the ability of speech to inflict emotional harm is not, in itself,
enough to justify abridgment,335 the psychic trauma that is at the root of the
fighting words doctrine 336 forms a constitutional basis for a moral
imperative.
As the Supreme Court stated in Chaplinsky v. New
337
Hampshire:
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free
speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
331. See generally UF Student Senate Says No to PC Ideology -

Ratifies Resolution,

DECLARATION, FLORIDA's CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Apr.-May 1995, at 3
[hereinafter DECLARATION].
332. The Cambridge Resolution, DECLARATION, FLORIDA'S CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Apr.-May 1995, at 4.
333. DECLARATION, supra note 331, at 3.

334.
335.
336.
337.

The Cambridge Resolution, supra note 332, at 4.
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that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in orderand morality. "Resort to epithets orpersonalabuse
is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion
as a criminal act
safeguardedby the Constitution,and its punishment
33 8
would raise no question under that instrument."
Thus, the Supreme Court has considered cases of hate speech and determined
that such hate speech falls within the fighting words exception to the First
Amendment. 339 Therefore, under the fighting words doctrine, as espoused
by the Court in Chaplinsky, hate speech enjoys little or no First Amendment
protection.34
Chaplinsky requires that the fighting words be "likely to
provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace."34 ' However, the state cannot prohibit offensive expression on the
assumption that such expression will incite a riot or cause the audience to
breach the peace."' Thus, the Court has built in a safety mechanism in the
form of an exacting probability of danger to trigger the fighting words
exception.
There is a problem with the doctrine of fighting words in the context of
hate speech codes. The Supreme Court requires that in order for fighting
words to be unprotected, they must contain an explicit link to a breach of the
peace through a retaliatory response.343 The current state of the doctrine
requires an aggressive reaction to the insulting communication."
However, in many contexts, the fighting words doctrine impedes achievement
of a remedy where hate speech has the exact opposite effect. Not that the
victim will retaliate, but that the victim will not retaliate.345 The implicit
assumption in the current fighting words doctrine is that aggressors and
victims have equal power and bargaining positions. 346 This is usually not
true; it is not a level playing field. Some persons of various cultural and

338. Id. at 571-72 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)) (emphasis
added).
339. Id. The defendant in Chaplinsky had called the complainant a "God damned
racketeer" and a "damned Fascist." Id. at 569.
340. Id.at 571.
341. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
This case dealt with the
342. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1989).
constitutionality of a state law banning the desecration of the United States flag. The majority
held that flag burning was a form of political speech, and therefore, was protected by the First
Amendment. Id.at 404-06.
343. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 570-71.

344. See id.
345. Balkin, supra note 212, at 421. Balkin gives the example of a young black woman
taunted by a group of white men who were yelling racial and sexist slurs. The woman does
not physically assault her aggressors. Instead, she runs away, attempting to escape their abuse.
Nonetheless, she is harmed. Id.
346. Lawrence, supra note 281, at 453-54.
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sexual backgrounds may not be physically provoked by an epithet.347
While some may feel like fighting and react in a physical manner to hate
speech, others may retreat from intimidation,348 since a violent response
might only provoke the aggressor more. 349 However, the passivity of the
victim's reaction does not mean that the speech is any less demeaning.3 50
Thus, the problem with utilizing the fighting words doctrine to combat hate
speech is in determining what set of values should be substituted for
the cur35
rent values, which are infected with preexisting social constructs. 1
The aggressive quality of the victim's reaction to hate speech should not
determine whether such speech is protected. 352 Despite the flight rather
353
than fight reaction, the preemptive effect of the invective is the same.
This concept requires slight, if any, modification of Chaplinsky. Chaplinsky
specified that speech, which because of its very existence inflicts injury, is
speech unprotected under the First Amendment fighting words doctrine.3M
This standard is designed to prevent "inexpressible emotions" from
falling "under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' poems or
Donne's sermons., 355 The true notion of fighting words, as articulated by
Justice Murphy, is aimed at harmful speech-action that does not contain any
social or political message. The revised standard is directed toward speech
that plays no role "indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth., 35 6 Although, "[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in
almost every activity,' 357 the Supreme Court noted that "such a kernel is
not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment. 358
Unfortunately, codes that define fighting words as they relate to hate
speech ignore the possibility of valid expression within their content. Furthermore, codes impute some bias and do not have room for differing
perspectives.
It cannot be stressed enough that to qualify under the fighting words

347. See Matsuda, supra note 1.
348. See id.
349. Lawrence, supra note 281, at 452.
350. Id.
351. See id.
352. Id. at 452.
353. Id.
354. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
355. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
356. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
357. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
358. Id.
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doctrine, hate speech must be "intended" as a personal attack." 9 The
doctrine requires a personal attack that provokes a reaction from the
victim." Thus, more generalized hate speech directed at a distinct group
would not fall within the category.
It is true that, in Beauharnais v. Illinois,36 1 the United States Supreme
Court recognized the viability of the group defamation doctrine when it held:
"[I]f an utterance directed at an individual may be the subject of criminal
sanctions, we cannot deny to a state power to punish the same utterance
directed at a defined group., 36 2 The Beauharnais Court affirmed Illinois'
power to punish the defendants for distributing racist flyers.363 In affirming
the defendants' guilt, the Court held that group libel was a legitimate theory
under which the state could prosecute persons for racist expression.3
Since the holding in Beauharnais, the Supreme Court has found that
under certain circumstances, libel laws do indeed implicate the First Amendment. 365 Although the Supreme Court has never overruled Beauharnais,
it has in fact done little with it. The fact is that after R.A. V, the rebirth of
Beauharnaisis problematic.
No matter where Chaplinsky, Brandenburg,Johnson and R.A. V end up,
there is one observation worth noting: the university is not the appropriate
policing agency to aid and abet in the narrowing of tolerance of free speech.
The university is the appropriate agency to aid and abet in the enlarging of
discourse with respect to limits of free speech.
What these cases suggest is that in a society governed by the rule of law
it is not possible to eradicate easily that which is contemptible. In the case
of hate speech, the speaker maintains certain rights under the Constitution,
as R.A. V recognized. No one would deny that in defending the speaker's
right to express speech freely, the rights of the victim should also be taken
into account.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, people possess the right of equal
protection. 3" This right demands that all similarly situated human beings
be treated by government in a similar manner unless compelling reasons exist
for an alternation in treatment. In fashioning a constitutionally functional

359. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-73.
360. Id. Under the expanded notion of fighting words, the reaction need not be violent.
361. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). The Court upheld a state law making "group libel" a punishable
offense. Id. The defendant had distributed racists flyers and had been convicted under the
statute. Id. at 252.
362. Id. at 258.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
366. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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hate-speech policy, First and Fourteenth Amendment interests must be
weighed and balanced. Free speech is never an absolute right; equal
protection under the law is as legitimate as any of the other factors that
temper the right to free speech. However, the venerable First Amendment
is essential to the proper functioning and preservation of a democratic,
republican society, and must above all else, be protected.
Despite the tension between these two paramount rights, the university
is not the appropriate academy to inculcate societal values through force and
censorship. It is little wonder that courts are reluctant to intervene at the
university level. In recent years, as exemplified by hate-speech codes, the
universities have become the high schools and grade schools of the land,
assuming the task of inculcating regional values. That is precisely why the
Court backed away from inker. It did not want to be a school board. As
long as the universities focus upon their primary task of seeking knowledge
and expanding tolerance, the courts will continue to protect their enterprise.
Persons in the university deserve an environment conducive to the enrichment
of all. Can censorship codes accomplish that goal? Too often universities
capitulate by ignoring the importance of intellectual speech. The protection
of the disenfranchised does not require the prior restraint of speech. The free
exchange of ideas is the hallmark of intellectual and academic freedom.
Courts are aware of this concept; sadly, many universities appear not to be.
Bigotry has no place in the whole of our society. But, dismantling traditional
intellectual freedom, which is important to accomplish universities' goals, and
replacing it with a structured, lower-school environment does a disservice to
all. Limiting lectures and discussions to politically-correct language and concepts, as determined by administrations, legislatures or even courts, is
intellectually dangerously disabling. Censorship will never cure the disease
of bigotry, sexism and homophobia, it will only nurture it.3 67 "In a8 democ36
racy, the answer to 'bad' speech is better speech, not no speech.9
XI.

CONCLUSION

Hate speech is abhorrent. It creates a hostile environment. Colleges and
universities, cities and states have attempted to curtail this offensive speech
and the actions that often follow with lengthy codes to protect nearly
everyone. Although race and religion appear to be the primary foci, and

367. STEPHEN V. BENET, THEY BURNED THE BOOKS (1942). "[W]hen I give the command,
you will rise and bring your textbooks to my desk. All this nonsense of freedom and
tolerance - that is finished. We shall give you new textbooks. The old ones will be burned
in the schoolyard. Are there any questions?" Id. at 12-13. See Comment, supra note 69, at
928 n. 1.
368. To the Editor: Marcia Pally and Joan Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1994, § 4, at
14.
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sexual harassment is an issue in the workplace and on campus, the codes also
have focused on disability, sexual orientation, ancestry, age, Vietnam-era
veteran status and marital status.
Codes and ordinances against hate speech have often been the result of
angry complaints by the victims and loud echoes by always-campaigning
legislators. Lawyers and law professors have worked with committees to
establish codes that will be acceptable to the state and federal courts, codes
that do not violate the First Amendment. There have been codes of conduct
and alternative sentencing guidelines. Students have been reprimanded, and
faculty and administrators admonished.
Why the overbroad, vague codes? Why the burdens on speech?
Perhaps, the colleges and universities continue to exude an atmosphere of
unequal power - of parent and child, or employer and employee. The
discerning student and faculty member is realistic and recognizes the
sovereignty of the institution, its ability to punish the former through grades
and recommendations and the latter through appointments and merit pay.
Perhaps the authors of the codes perform a dual chameleon like function or
even a Jekyll and Hyde role by answering the needs of the victims and the
politically-correct administration yet believing that rules do not change
behavior, and hence, only serve as alarms, guidelines or pacifiers. These
rules can then be used to scapegoat the courts that overturn them.
Arguments have been made that the commitment to freedom of speech
is destroying our society rather than preserving our freedom. Some might
argue that in an age of concentrated control of the mass media, there are too
few stalls in the market for the marketplace theory still to be viable. Perhaps
the balance of power is so distorted that there is little or no real sense of the
damage hate speech can and does inflict. The awareness may only be heightened when budgets or tax status are threatened.
Black students in any recognizable numbers have been on "white" campuses for less than a half century and in law schools for some twenty years.
Women have a similar occupation record. College faculties continue to be
representative of the good old boys. The inculcative interest cuts both ways;
it may require some deterrence of intolerant expression, and it may require
enforced tolerance of the intolerant.
Historically, we have purported to support free speech. This support,
however, is tenuous when it concerns free speech at home. In 1977, some
fifty American Nazis with swastikas and storm troop uniforms wanted to
demonstrate in Skokie, Illinois where there was a large Jewish population and
"as many as several thousand" of the citizens were Holocaust survivors.369
The city quickly passed ordinances and secured injunctions to prevent the

369. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199 (1978).
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demonstrations.370 The angry townspeople and their national and international supporters claimed that the Nazi form of expression was deliberately
calculated to ignite violence. 37' The fact is, the First Amendment has not
been limited to ideas and symbols that further freedom, dignity, nonviolence
and just causes.372
Banning speech could undermine the goal of combatting prejudice. An
antihate speech policy could stultify candid intergroup dialogue on racism
and other forms of bias. Education, free discussion and the airing of
misunderstandings and failures of sensitivity are more likely to promote
positive intergroup relations than are legal battles. The rules barring hate
speech will continue to generate newspaper stories and some litigation.
Other forms of controversy will exacerbate intergroup tensions. The censorship approach is diversionary. It makes it easier for communities to avoid
coming to grips with less convenient and more expensive, but ultimately,
more meaningful approaches for combatting discrimination. The university
community plays a different role; it cannot be treated like the workplace. It
has a legitimate interest in facilitating the development of tolerance and
respect for dissenting views. R.A. V clearly signals the Court's intent to
protect speech, though not speech action.373 It establishes precedent for
university hate-speech codes. There are sufficient means at the institutions'
disposal to prevent reprehensible speech without adding the First Amendment
to the fire.
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